

# Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council: Value for Money Governance Review

Year ended 31 March 2021

3 December 2021



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The contents of this report relate only to those matters which came to our attention during the conduct of our normal audit procedures which are designed for the purpose of completing our work under the NAO Code and related guidance. Our audit is not designed to test all arrangements in respect of value for money. However, where, as part of our testing, we identify significant weaknesses, we will report these to you. In consequence, our work cannot be relied upon to disclose all irregularities, or to include all possible improvements in arrangements that a more extensive special examination might identify. We do not accept any responsibility for any loss occasioned to any third party acting, or refraining from acting on the basis of the content of this report, as this report was not prepared for, nor intended for, any other purpose.

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## Introduction

### Context, background and scope of the review

### Context to our VFM approach

Sections 20 and 21 of the Local Audit and Accountably Act 2014 (the Act) require auditors to be satisfied that the Council has made proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources. This is known as the Value for Money (VFM) conclusion.

Our VfM work is carried out in line with the Code of Audit Practice (the Code) which is prepared by the National Audit Office (NAO) under the Act, and its supporting statutory guidance: Auditor Guidance Note 3 (AGN 03).

A revised Code came into force on 1 April 2020, after being approved by Parliament. The Code requires auditors to structure their VfM commentary on arrangements under three specified reporting criteria:

- Improving economy, efficiency and effectiveness: how the Council uses information about its costs and performance to improve the way it manages and delivers its services;
- Governance: how the Council ensures that it makes informed decisions and properly manages its risks; and
- Financial sustainability: how the Council plans and manages its resources to ensure it can continue to deliver its services.

#### **Background to this review**

In our 2019/20 Audit Findings Report we noted that a number of governance issues had come to our attention during 2021. We considered that there was insufficient evidence to confirm that these matters impacted 2019/20 and as such noted that they will be dealt with as part of the 2020/21 audit.

We have continued to monitor Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council's (the Council) ongoing governance arrangements, including member-officer relationships and have become increasingly concerned at the Council's ability to look forward and manage the challenges and opportunities that all local authorities currently face.

There is an increasing perception of poor progress in resolving service and governance issues, a lack of trust between key individuals charged with governance, of a significant amount of time being spent responding to allegations and complaints, and of reviews being reopened, such as the reopening of previous standards reviews. We feel that until these significant issues are resolved that the Council is at risk of not having adequate governance arrangements in place to ensure that it can effectively discharge its statutory responsibilities and maintain its financial sustainability.

Under the NAO Code, we are required to consider whether the Council has put in place proper arrangements to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources. The auditor is no longer required to give a binary qualified / unqualified VfM conclusion. Instead, auditors report in more detail on the Council's overall arrangements, as well as key recommendations on any significant weaknesses in arrangements identified during the audit.

The purpose of this work has been to draw conclusions on the key lines of enquiry (KLOEs) identified as part of our scope, and if necessary determine the extent to which further action is required by the Council. This review, along with other VfM related activity, has been undertaken in order for us to consider whether there are any significant weaknesses in the Council's arrangements.

As already noted, our work is undertaken in accordance with the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, sections 20 and 24 and may result in Statutory Recommendations or a Public Interest Report.

#### Overview of the scope

Determining how much work to undertake on arrangements to secure VfM is a matter of auditor judgement. The focus of our review has been on the effectiveness of the Council's governance arrangements and how they are impacted by the matters detailed above.

We have identified seventeen KLOEs to assess the Council's governance arrangements, which are set out in the table below.

Whilst the focus of this review is on governance arrangements, where appropriate we will highlight findings in relation to the two other reporting areas set out in the Code.

	SERVICES & MANAGEMENT
A1	The Children's Trust
A2	Sandwell Leisure Trust
A3	Providence Place
A4	Special Educational Needs Transport
A5	Sandwell Land and Property Company
A6	MADE festival
A7	Waste service
A8	Governance and legal support re DPH
A9	Lion Farm
A10	Introduction of new ERP system (Oracle)

### Our approach

### Overview of the scope (cont'd)

	MEETINGS, COMPLAINTS & RELATIONSHIPS
B1	Chief Officers
B1 B2	Senior Leadership
B3	Complaints
B4	Officers and members relationships
B5	Standards Committee
B3 B4 B5 B6 B7	Audit Committee
B7	Financial Reporting

#### Our approach

Our work in relation to this review was undertaken between August and October 2021.

#### Stage 1 – Review of key documents

We submitted an information request for key documents and then undertook a desk top review to reach an initial conclusion on the nature of further work required.

#### Stage 2 – Further Analysis and Clarifications

We then undertook interviews with key stakeholders in relation to each KLOE to clarity issues identified during stage one and to undertake more detailed analysis in relation to specific KLOEs. A total of 75 stakeholder interviews have been undertaken, representing a total of 122 discussions on individual KLOEs.

Our approach is designed to assess:

- · Governance arrangements in place in relation to our scope;
- Council performance against these arrangements; and
- Identify any significant weaknesses and risks.

### CfGS Governance Risk and Resilience Framework

We have drawn on the Centre for Governance and Scrutiny's (CfGS) Governance Risk and Resilience Framework, published in March 2021, to structure our work in relation to KLOE B4 - officer and member relationships. This Framework includes seven characteristics of good governance that have a particular focus on behaviours.

### Acknowledgements

We would like to take this opportunity to record our appreciation for the assistance provided by council officers, council members, and external stakeholders with whom we have engaged during the course of our review.

### Additional VfM Code Work

As already noted, we have identified governance arrangements as an audit risk. This requires additional work to inform our auditor's judgement on VfM. The work has been undertaken in line with the requirements of the Code and associated auditor guidance. This review helps us discharge our responsibilities under the Code and will include the reporting of any significant weaknesses in arrangements and other points for improvement identified during the review. Any fee variation is subject to approval from Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd (PSAA) which is responsible for appointing auditors and setting audit fees for relevant authorities that have chosen to opt into its national scheme of auditor appointments.



# Key Findings

Note: KLOE A8 has not yet concluded and will be reported separately.

### **Overview**

### **Overview**

The Council has seen deteriorating senior officer and senior member relationships over a number of years. This has resulted in a breakdown in trust, respect and confidence between those holding governance roles. This has limited the Council's ability to look forward and manage the challenges and opportunities it faces. This breakdown in relationships between senior officers and senior members is central to the governance issues identified by this review.

There has been poor progress in resolving service and governance issues, with a significant amount of time being spent responding to internal allegations and complaints. There is evidence of reviews and issues being reopened. This has impacted on the Council's ability to focus on service improvement.

The Council has been insular and siloed. Its focus has been on responding to external service-based challenges as well as managing the fallout from previous decisions or investigations. Senior officers and senior members have historically been unable to make the changes required to move away from this organisational culture and focus.

We note that since the appointment of the interim Chief Executive in August 2021, working with the then new Leader of the Council, that many of these matters are being resolved. The Council's senior leadership team, the majority of whom are recent external appointments, recognise the challenges and issues set out in this report and are supporting the interim Chief Executive on an improvement journey.

These 'green shoots' are positive and we have tried to reflect the improvements in this report. Without these changes we would have had concerns with regard to the Council's ability to manage and govern itself, and intervention by the Government may have been necessary.

Inevitably these changes are not yet embedded, and the Council will need to manage the transition to a permanent Chief Executive well, alongside maintaining continuity and stability of the wider leadership team, so that the new Chief Executive, working with the leadership team, continues to support the service and cultural changes that are being put in place and that momentum is maintained.

Due to the issues identified we have determined that it is appropriate to raise the following statutory recommendations under Section 24 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act:

### Statutory recommendations

We have made a number of statutory and key recommendations which are set out page 12. Other improvement recommendations are made throughout the detailed findings of this report and are summarised in the Appendix.

Our statutory recommendations are:

- It is imperative that senior officers and senior members take effective corporate grip of long-standing service issues highlighted by the findings in this report (including SLT, SCT, the waste service, the ERP system, and Lion Farm) and prioritise corporate effort in managing the issues identified, and embed the solutions into the Council.
- The Council must ensure that the learning in relation to commercial decisions, procurement and contract management highlighted in this report are understood through the organisation.
- Senior leadership, both officers and members, must demonstrate that they can continue to work together effectively, that they operate in line with the Council's values, codes, policies and procedures, and that there is zero tolerance to inappropriate behaviours. This includes changing the organisational culture in relation to complaints so that they restore balance and proportionality.

### **Key findings**

### **KEY FINDINGS**

### **Corporate grip**

Understandably COVID-19 has significantly impacted the leadership and organisational focus of all local authorities over the past eighteen months. Even taking account of this impact we consider that until recently the Council has failed to take an effective corporate grip on key issues facing the Council.

We note that it is hindered in taking a corporate grip by the lack of a clear performance management framework and agreed key corporate indicators, although we note recent progress has been made on this. This has impacted on the ability of the Leadership Team and Cabinet to have a single line of sight and single version of the truth. This has contributed to a culture of silo working, resulting in a lack of corporate ownership and accountability. This has, in turn, resulted in a lack of ownership and grip on key challenges and issues and an absence of intervention and decision making.

In failing to take ownership and seeking resolution, lessons have not been learned. This has resulted in a number of instances whereby the Council has repeated actions leading to similar outcomes. For example, the Wragge report continues to be an area of mistrust between members and between officers and members.

### Procurement and commercial decision making

Our review has identified repeated instances where commercial decisions or procurement decisions have contributed to a number of key legacy challenges facing the Council, which have not been resolved.

These included legacy property related decisions such as those relating to Lion Farm, Providence Place and Sandwell Land and Property Company where there was either a lack of appropriate expertise and advice or failure to consider all appropriate options.

There are also more recent examples of poor procurement decisions relating to waste management and recycling, the Council's enterprise and resource planning (ERP) system and SEND Transport. In each case the procurements have either been poorly specified, did not provide adequate timescales, or those responsible for decision making have not been fully aware of the context and detail.

These property transactions and procurement decisions have created future service or delivery challenges. In some cases, they have impacted negatively on the Council's reputation. In each instance, until recently, the decisions have not had effective corporate ownership to allow appropriate management or resolution.

### **Contract management**

Our review identified a number of key contracts having been impacted by either poor specification during procurement, a lack of clear contract management responsibility, or poorly defined approaches to contract management. These related to Sandwell Leisure Trust (SLT), Serco, Inoapps and Sandwell Children's Trust (SCT) and we note that the interim Chief Executive has recently commenced more effective engagement with these key suppliers and partners.

At varying times relationships between the Council and these key partners have been fraught with the lack of senior leadership grip significantly contributing to a deterioration of these relationships. A lack of clear corporate ownership has meant that issues with these contracts have not been resolved in a timely manner. This is particularly the case for SLT, Serco and Inoapps.

We also note that some key contracts such as SLT and SCT, have not previously had key performance indicators reviewed since the contracts were let, whilst others have not had appropriate focus on service quality (such as SEND Transport) or outcomes (such as SLT and Serco).

### **OTHER THEMES**

### Lack of longer-term planning

The insularity and short-term focus previously noted has meant that the Council has not had the necessary time and space to consider the long-term. Recent changes to the Council's leadership have seen a re-emphasis on longer-term planning, with time invested in a refresh of the Corporate Plan, which has now been approved by full Council.

However, as mentioned earlier, the lack of a corporate performance framework has meant that the Council has not received management information on key corporate indicators. We also note that the Leadership Team had not been receiving regular monthly budget monitoring reports and have not been effectively engaged in the budget setting process or medium-term financial planning. We understand that processes are being put in place to resolve these issues.

### Key findings (cont'd)

#### Officer empowerment and decision making

The scheme of delegation and the involvement of senior members in key decision making has resulted in a lack of empowerment of officers in decision making and the agility of the Council to make, where necessary, prompt decisions. An example of which is the delay to taking a decision in relation to the rescheduled MADE Festival, which had been due to take place in August 2021. We consider that this reflects the lack of trust between senior members and senior officers at the time.

### Capacity, experience and skills

The prevalence of interim and acting up arrangements in senior officer roles has in some places not seen effective back-fill arrangements put in place, resulting in capacity challenges for some key officers and teams such as Finance. These temporary arrangements have contributed to confusion over some key roles and responsibilities, such as those in relation to SLT and Oracle Fusion, impacting on effective contract management.

More generally, the lack of corporate ownership, again already discussed, has left some officers exposed in managing key service challenges and relationships without appropriate senior officer support and direction.

#### The impact of changes to senior officers and members

The Council has been through a period of significant change to its leadership, both in terms of senior officers and senior members. Following the local elections in May 2021 a new Leader was elected, who appointed a new Cabinet with effect from June 2021. Many of these Cabinet members had not previously held a Cabinet role, and some were fairly new to the role of councillor. There was a further change to the Council Leader in late November 2021, as we were finalising this report.

An interim Chief Executive has been in role since August 2021 and there has been significant changes to chief officers over the past year, with vacancies being filled by either external interims, or Council officers in acting up roles. These changes were driven in large part by a senior management review which concluded in October 2020, although we note that some chief officer departures were caused by unrelated circumstances.

Other than the Chief Executive there are currently ten chief officer roles, of these four are recent external appointments, and two other external appointments have been made with these officers starting in November 2021. Three officers remain from the previous leadership team, two in the same role and one appointed to one of the new roles created by the review.

Two roles remain vacant: the Chief Executive and the Deputy Chief Executive, with the recruitment of the former recently initiated. The Council has decided to not recruit the Deputy Chief Executive and to review the need for this role. In addition there is a Director of HR, which is not a permanent role and is being held by an external interim.

The impact of this recent period of change has been instability and uncertainty for the organisation. Whilst external interims are recognised positively for the experience they bring from working with other councils and having a "fresh pair of eyes" on some of the service challenges being faced, the wider organisation considers the use of interims as maintaining a holding pattern before permanent chief officers join. The Council will reach the position of having all roles filled by a permanent officers during November 2021, other than the two vacancies noted above.

The changes to key senior roles have led to a loss of corporate knowledge and history among senior officers and senior members. The has contributed to historic issues resurfacing and senior members making the initial decision to progress a major project or initiative not being the same group of members taking further decisions during the project's implementation, such as the SEND Transport procurement.

### The current position

The themes set out in this section illustrate how the Council's recent behaviours and legacy issues impact on good governance and decision making.

The recent widespread changes at chief officer level and the election a new Leader and appointment of a new Cabinet, provide a significant opportunity for the Council to move away from this position. Indeed, there is a consensus that senior officers and members are in a much stronger, more effective and constructive position than in the recent past. There is also a clear desire to make the improvements required, and a greater understanding of roles and responsibilities.

The current Leader and interim Chief Executive have a positive working relationship and between them have introduced changes to manage some of the legacy issues noted above. These include the Leadership Team attending informal Cabinet, the introduction of "star chambers" as part of the budget setting process, enhancing the training programme for members, and a review of the Council's constitution including the scheme of delegation. Other changes are planned.

### Key findings (cont'd)

### The current position (cont'd)

Many of these changes took place during the course of this review so it is too soon to judge if they are yet embedded. Key stakeholders we met during this review recognised that the Council is at the start of a necessary improvement journey. Failure to maintain and embed current and planned changes will have a significant impact on the Council being able to realise its strategic ambitions and provide effective governance.

Whilst we recognise that recent changes have been positive, we remain concerned about the lack of trust across the wider organisation and continuing poor behaviours, for example, the leaking of the review into the Wragge report to local media in October 2021. It will take time for the wider organisation to regain trust in the senior leadership, see the stability required, and believe in the changes that have begun.

There was a change to the Council's Leader as we were finalising this report. This has highlighted the need for stability and continuity. The new Leader must use the platform for improvement which has been created to ensure a strong and positive working relationship both with the current Interim Chief Executive and the subsequent permanent Chief Executive.

The direction of travel is a necessary and positive one, but there is no quick fix for the challenges facing the Council. For these "green shoots" to deliver the widespread transformation and changes required, the Council's leadership needs be relentless in its focus in delivering and embedding sustainable change, and use its past history as a reference point when focusing on improvement.

### **Recommendations and detailed findings**

We now set out our statutory and key recommendations, followed by the detailed findings in relation to each individual KLOE.

We consider that these matters represent significant weaknesses in the Council's arrangements for ensuring that it makes informed decisions and properly manages its risks. We have also identified several improvement recommendations, which are summarised at Appendix A. Further details on the types of recommendations we make are set out at Appendix B.



# Statutory and key recommendations

### Statutory and key recommendations

Improvement recommendations are made throughout this report and these are summarised in the Appendix. Our statutory and key recommendations are summarised below.

#	Recommendation
	Statutory recommendations
1.	It is imperative that senior officers and senior members take effective corporate grip of long-standing service issues highlighted by the findings in this report: (including SLT, SCT, the waste service, the ERP system, and Lion Farm) and prioritise corporate effort in managing the issues identified, and embed the solutions into the Council.
2.	The Council must ensure that the learning in relation to commercial decisions, procurement and contract management highlighted in this report are understood through the organisation.
3.	Senior leadership, both officers and members, must demonstrate that they can continue to work together effectively, that they operate in line with the Council's values, codes, policies and procedures, and that there is zero tolerance to inappropriate behaviours. This includes changing the organisational culture in relation to complaints so that they restore balance and proportionality.
	Key recommendations
4.	The Council's leadership needs be relentless in its focus in delivering and embedding sustainable change, and use its past history as a reference point when focusing on improvement.
5.	Critical to embedding the transformation and change required will be the appointment of the right permanent Chief Executive. The Council must ensure an effective recruitment process, including attracting a pool of appropriate candidates.
6.	The Council should ensure that a corporate performance framework is agreed so that the implementation of the Corporate Plan can be effectively monitored, and there is collective corporate responsibility rather than silo working.
7.	Members in key statutory roles, in particular in relation to Cabinet, scrutiny, standards and audit, need to be provided with effective induction and ongoing development, training and support. The member development programme should be reviewed to ensure corporate governance forms part of the training for members with governance roles.
8.	The Council should develop and agree an action plan in relation to the statutory, key and improvement recommendations included in this report, ensuring that they are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bound.

### **Statutory and key recommendations**

Management responses to each statutory and key recommendation are summarised below.

#	Management responses
	Statutory recommendations
1.	
2.	
3.	
	Key recommendations
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	

# **Detailed Findings**

### **KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider whether relationships between senior officers and senior members are appropriate in supporting good governance.

### Introduction

We have set out our findings in relation to this KLOE before any of the other KLOEs due to the overarching importance of senior officer and senior member relationships for the discharging of effective governance and decision making.

We have drawn on the Centre for Governance and Scrutiny's (CfGS) Governance Risk and Resilience Framework, published in March 2021. The framework is designed to promote good governance practice and:

- recognises good governance is everyone's responsibility, and whatever their role, officers and councillors are likely to carry out work that intersects with the Council's governance framework every day:
- considers roles and responsibilities including those of the Council's statutory • officers and political leadership
- includes a focus on behaviours:
- sets out seven characteristics for considering governance risk and management, designed to reflect and supplement the broader CIPFA/SOLACE: "Delivering good governance in local government" framework (2016).

We have structured our findings by the seven characteristics, which are:

- The extent of recognition of individual and collective responsibility for good governance;
- Awareness of political dynamics; ٠
- How the council looks to the future to set its decision-making priorities;
- Officer and councillor roles:
- How the Council's real situation compares to its sense of itself;
- Quality of local / external relationships; and
- The state of member oversight through scrutiny and audit.

Twenty-five meetings were held with individual senior officers and senior members of the Council in relation to this KLOE, and our findings are based on our judgement of these key stakeholders' observations.

### The extent of recognition of individual and collective responsibility for good governance

The Council is coming out of a period where there has been a breakdown in the trust, confidence and respect between senior officers and senior members, which has been characterised by:

- a perceived blame culture contributing to the siloed approach to directorates, with senior officers protecting their areas of responsibility and a lack of peer challenge within the Leadership Team and a risk of not giving bad news to members.
- a lack of collective responsibility and accountability in the absence of a corporate focus on key performance indicators and risks, weak corporate involvement in strategic financial planning, budget monitoring, and transparency.
- a lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities between officers and members.
- an inconsistent approach to the Council's scheme of delegation, including relatively low spending thresholds, and an overly bureaucratic approach to decision making, leading to unnecessary delays.

The characteristics set out above are a significant risk to good governance. However, we note that there have been recent improvements. We discuss these below.

The recent widespread changes at chief officer level and the election of a new Leader and appointment of a new Cabinet, provide a significant opportunity for the Council to move away from this position. Indeed, there is consensus that senior officers and members are in a much stronger, more effective and constructive position than in the recent past. There is a clear desire to make the improvements required, and greater understanding of roles and responsibilities.

The current officer and member leadership team have introduced changes to manage the legacy issues noted above, including the Leadership Team attending informal Cabinet, the introduction of "star chambers" as part of the budget setting process, enhancing the training programme for members, and a review of the Council's constitution including the scheme of delegation. All of these are positive actions.

Embedding the changes that have been made and that are planned will be critical if the Council is to realise its strategic ambition and provide effective governance. Whilst early indications are positive, the test of whether these changes become effectively embedded will be how the council's senior leadership manage legacy issues should they surface, and that they continue the work of the interim Chief Executive through the appointment of a high quality permanent Chief Executive.

An enhancement of the induction programme to new members of Cabinet, including on local government finance and their governance roles is recommended. 15

### KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships (cont'd)

### Awareness of political dynamics

The Council has recently updated its Code of Member Conduct, incorporating updates to the Local Government Association (LGA) Model Code of Conduct. A member development programme is ongoing in relation to the Code and related areas such as gifts and hospitality, and arrangements for dealing with complaints under the Code. The Council has also commissioned the LGA to provide a mentoring programme for senior members.

There was consensus from our interviews that senior officers fully understood the need to act with neutrality when operating in a political environment. However, the recent history of the Council means that some senior officers remain impacted by the blame culture which was perceived to be place. This, for example, has manifested itself in senior officers taking personally criticism of their service area, impacting on behaviours in meetings.

Whilst having in place effective codes, policies and procedures is good practice, it will be behaviours that determine whether the Council is able to successfully move away from its recent history. However, as already noted, the senior officers and members of the Council believe that there has been significant progress made in relation to how they operate and work together.

These changes in behaviour are recent and will need to be sustained to become embedded, so that the wider organisation - and external stakeholders - see and have confidence in this change.

The Council should consider how it provides appropriate support to those Chief Officers who were in role prior to the recent changes to senior officers, Leader and Cabinet. The Council should also ensure that corporate governance training is provided to members of the Cabinet and other members in governance related roles.

#### How the council looks to the future to set its decision-making priorities

There was consensus that the Council has not provided appropriate time and space to think clearly about the long-term, to horizon scan and undertake the strategic thinking required.

It was recognised that this was because the Council has spent recent years "fire-fighting" both in terms of managing day-to-day operational issues, as well as having an insular focus responding to internal allegations and complaints. There is also evidence of reviews and issues being reopened.

A Corporate Plan (Vision 2030) has been in place but there has been a lack of clarity about how the Plan's ambitions, priorities and outcomes should be delivered. This has been recognised, and the Council has recently invested significant leadership time in a refresh of the Corporate Plan, including external consultation. More work needs to be done including the establishment of Directorate Plans and Service Plans which will set out how corporate priorities will be delivered, including KPIs. The Leader has recently restructured Cabinet portfolios to better reflect the updated Corporate Plan.

The Council should ensure that corporate KPIs are agreed so that the implementation of the Corporate Plan can be effectively monitored.

### The forward plan of the Cabinet should be shared with the Audit Committee and Scrutiny Board to help structure their agenda planning.

There has been an ineffective approach to budget monitoring and budget setting with:

- monthly budget reports not being reported to the Cabinet or the Leadership Team, and
- Directors and Portfolio Holders not being effectively engaged in budget setting discussions.

This has been recognised and star chambers for Cabinet members and chief officers have been introduced to support the budget setting process. The Director of Finance has also introduced regular Cabinet briefings and monthly budget reporting to Cabinet.

The Leadership Team should agree key medium-term financial objectives and principles. There should be effective ownership of the principles that underpin the budget setting process, for example the Council's approach to reserves, contingency and Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).

### KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships (cont'd)

#### Officer and councillor roles

As already noted there has been a breakdown in trust and mutual respect between senior officers and members in recent years, which is recognised by those in senior officer and senior member roles. However, in general, those in these roles felt that working relationships, including trust and respect, had improved in recent months and were currently no cause for concern. Nonetheless it was also recognised that a cultural shift needs to become firmly embedded, and that stability and continuity is required from those in these roles.

The Council has agreed the following values to define how people do things and are reflected in the way people behave:

- Trust show respect, make personal impact, being open and honest.
- Unity focusing on customers, working with a team, communicating effectively.
- Progress being open to change, focusing on performance, getting team results.

Senior officers and senior members must lead by example to ensure that the "tone from the top" consistently reflects these values and behaviours. This is critical in ensuring that the wider organisation recognises that changes have been made and that all people are confident in adopting these values and behaviours. This should build on recently introduced staff briefings to include a programme of staff engagement including "pulse" checks to benchmark and monitor progress on the organisation's wellbeing.

As with all councils, it was recognised that members come from different backgrounds, bringing different skills and capabilities. A member development programme is in place, with the Council being supported by the Local Government Association (LGA) in its update and delivery, and member personal development plans have been introduced, which is good practice.

The Council should ensure that the review of the member development programme is appropriate. In particular, thought should be given to how members with special responsibility roles are developed and supported. This should include succession planning for these roles.

#### How the council's real situation compares to its sense of self

It was felt that Members have a good understanding of their communities' needs and what outcomes are required to meet these needs, particularly in relation to their wards. However, it was recognised – as already mentioned – that the Council needs to ensure that these needs and outcomes are reflected in corporate priorities and outcomes and delivery is effectively monitored. Similarly, while improvements are being made in relation to public consultation on the Corporate Plan there remains no visible consultation on the Council's budget setting priorities.

A key area of weakness is the lack of a performance management framework to manage corporate progress against key performance indicators. More also needs to be done to change the siloed approach to managing service delivery. We note that there has not been a structured or effective "early warning" system in place for the Council's Leadership Team to identify key risks and issues.

This has been recognised and arrangements are being put in place so that the Leadership Team reviews strategic risks, budget monitoring and other performance data. However, further work is required to establish a formal performance management framework and agree a set of key corporate indicators for the Leadership Team to collectively manage, receive appropriate management information to monitor progress, and set out clear lines of accountability, responsibility, and delegated authority.

The Council has not had a consistent approach to financial benchmarking and so has had an absence of unit costs and financial trend data. The new Director of Finance has recently introduced financial benchmarking, which is good practice. This will need to be sustained to create a culture of curiosity in services in how nearest statistical neighbours are performing, to support savings identification and to drive improvements.

The recent restructuring of Council departments has resulted in a lack of clarity as to which department some services sit in, with the architects of the restructuring no longer working for the Council. Finance and services are currently working through such service allocations, but until this work is completed, financial reporting will not be fully aligned to departmental structures.

More generally there is good evidence that many senior officers are engaged in their respective professional bodies, which includes sharing learning, and that the Council is corporately engaged with the LGA.

### KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships (cont'd)

### Quality of local / external relationships

The quality of local / external relationships is mixed. The Council works with a variety of local public, private and third sector bodies, and these relationships vary by service. It is recognised that the pandemic has enhanced relationships with some local public sector organisations, such as the NHS and police, and with local voluntary and community organisations, and that the Council should ensure that these gains are maintained.

However, the Council has had an insularity in recent years, which in particular has impacted its engagement with businesses, and sub-regional bodies such as the LEP and the West Midlands Combined Authority. This is recognised by the current political leadership of the Council and there are signs of a move to more active participation in key sub-regional bodies. Rebuilding these key strategic relationships will take time for the Council to realise any benefits and "punch at its weight" as the 34<sup>th</sup> largest council in England. It will be important that this more outward looking approach is sustained.

The insularity of the Council has also meant that its communications to external organisations has been weak, for example resulting in a lack of external clarity on the Council's key strategic priorities. This is also reflected in a passive approach to communicating to local residents and businesses. This too has been recognised and the Council is investing in its central communications team and aims to be more proactive in managing the narrative on the Council, including greater communication of positive news stories.

When investing in the communications team, the Council should also use this as an opportunity to ensure more effective internal communications, including with backbench members.

The Council has a number of key external partners for the delivery of services such as waste and recycling, children's social care, and leisure. These relationships are covered in separate KLOEs.

#### The state of member oversight through scrutiny and audit

The role that scrutiny and audit should play in holding a council's decision-makers to account makes these roles fundamentally important to the successful functioning of local democracy and good governance. Effective scrutiny helps secure the efficient delivery of public services and can drive improvements within the Council. Conversely, poor scrutiny can be indicative of wider governance, leadership and service failure.

The effectiveness of the Scrutiny Boards and the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee were viewed as needing improvement by those interviewed and, in particular, by senior officers.

The Labour Party has been in control of the Council since 1979 and for many years had not had an official opposition. The position changed at the May 2021 local elections when the Conservative Party gained nine seats (having previously held no seats). From a governance perspective this was welcomed by both the senior officers and senior members who we met during the course of our review.

However, whilst areas of effective activity were recognised, the long period of having no opposition has meant that the audit and scrutiny functions have not always effectively held key decision makers to account. This was a widely held view amongst officers we interviewed.

There is a need to ensure that members of scrutiny and audit committees are aware of their governance roles including how to interrogate reports and ask the right questions. This is recognised by the Council who are working with the LGA to develop and provide a member training programme for members with scrutiny and audit roles.

### KLOE A1: Sandwell Children's Trust

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider actions undertaken by the Council to secure improvement in children's social care outcomes.

### Background

Following an inadequate / requires improvement Ofsted inspection in June 2015, at its meeting on 19 October 2016, Cabinet was advised of the Government's Statutory Direction (under Section 479A of the Education Act 1996) to set up a new arrangement in the form of a children's trust to deliver children's social care services. As a result, Sandwell Children's Trust (SCT) started operating on 1 April 2018. Any alternative to the current arrangement must be agreed by the Secretary of State for Education.

A 10-year service delivery contract (SDC) between the Council and SCT commenced 1 April 2018, setting out the requirements for the provision of children's social care. The SDC obligation was to reach an Ofsted judgement of 'Requires Improvement' by 2020 and to secure an Ofsted judgement of 'Good' by 2022. However, due to the impact of COVID-19 and the cessation of full inspections by Ofsted in 2020, a full Ofsted inspection may not take place in 2021 but is more likely to be in early 2022.

The Ofsted Inspection carried out in November 2017 and reported in January 2018 noted that most of the recommendations from the Ofsted 2015 inspection had not been fully met and some services have declined in effectiveness.

Our Audit Findings Report for 2019/20 noted that we had completed a risk-based review of the Council's value for money arrangements and concluded that the Council had proper arrangements in place to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources except for its arrangements around children's services which have been rated as 'inadequate' by Ofsted.

We concluded that there were weaknesses in the Council's arrangements for delivering services for children in need of help and protection, children looked after and care leavers. These matters were considered evidence of weaknesses in proper arrangements for understanding and using appropriate and reliable financial and performance information to support informed decision making and performance management. This led to a qualified 'except for' value for money conclusion for 2019/20.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

### **Governance arrangements**

There is a robust governance framework in place for the Council and other stakeholders to monitor the performance of SCT.

The contract requires that the Director of Children's Services, together with Council senior officers from finance and legal services, and the Chief Executive of the Trust meet on at least a monthly basis to consider performance and operational matters at an Operational Partnership Board (OPB). The Council's Lead Member for Children's Services and the Chief Executive meet quarterly with the Chair of the Trust Board and the Chief Executive of the Trust, at a Strategic Partnership Board (SPB).

The contract also requires the Trust to provide a comprehensive annual review for consideration by the OPB and the SPB and then by the Cabinet. Progress against the performance indicators for the period 1 April to 31 March is set out in an Annual Review, together with information about financial, workforce, and other performance areas.

On behalf of the Council, the Trust has developed an Improvement Plan in response to the Ofsted inspection findings published in January 2018. This plan was presented to Cabinet in September 2018 and covered a three-year period. The Trust has undertaken a refresh of the Improvement Plan. The delivery of the improvement plan is overseen by an Improvement Board, which is independently chaired, with representatives from the Council, Trust and Department for Education attending.

DfE appoint the Chair of the SCT Board, carry out six-monthly monitoring visits, are invited to attend OPB and meet regularly with the Chair and CEO of the Trust. They also attend the Improvement Board and have provided approximately £7m of improvement funding to the Trust over the past three years, to address specific improvement areas.

The Trust is required to report to the Council's Scrutiny Board twice each year as part of the obligations set out in the SDC. At the meeting of 23 August 2021, reports in respect of the annual review, the improvement plan, the pandemic response and the adoption service were presented to the Children's Services and Education Scrutiny Board. The Council's Audit and Risk Assurance Committee and Cabinet also received reports on the Trust, and the Cabinet approves the Trust's business plan.

### KLOE A1: Sandwell Children's Trust (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider actions undertaken by the Council to secure improvement in children's social care outcomes.

### Governance arrangements (cont'd)

In addition to the above, SCT activity also features in wider children's services governance arrangements, the Children's Safeguarding Partnership and the Children and Young People Commissioning Partnership.

In summary, there are comprehensive governance arrangements in place relating to SCT. Given the complexity of these governance arrangements we recommend a review to ensure that officers and members with roles on the various governance bodies are clear on their responsibilities, to avoid duplication and ensure effective communication between those holding governance roles and that there is a collective understanding of the performance of SCT and how risks and issues are being managed.

#### **Contract management**

The SDC includes a set of 15 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which are monitored by the Council. We have been advised that when the SDC initially went live that this KPIs were not agreed, rather they were agreed during the first quarter of the Trust's operation. They have not been revised subsequently.

An officer with formal responsibility for managing the SDC was not appointed until Spring 2021, previously this role was spread across a number of different officers.

As part of contract management arrangements there is provision to negotiate the Council's annual funding with SCT (the contract sum) which feeds into Council's annual budget setting process.

The SDC sets out the steps and timing of the negotiation of the contract sum, which includes reviews by OPB, SPB, and the Council's Cabinet and Scrutiny Board.

The following contract sums have been agreed:

- 2018/19: £58,229,695
- 2019/20: £64,043,000
- 2020/21: £65,828,000
- 2021/22: £68,028,000

A request for additional  $\pounds$ 500,000 has been made by SCT during this financial year, which the Cabinet has approved and is being funded via a COVID-19 reserve. This will form a contract variation to the 2021/22 contract sum.

The Council has sought to reduce the contract sum since the creation of the Trust, seeking improvement and transformation from SCT. This has not happened and has negatively impacted on relationships during some annual contract sum negotiations. This was particularly the case during 2020 when the Council and SCT were unable to agree the contract sum. As a result, DfE became involved and the then Children's Minister supported mediation. DfE funded specialist financial support to provide assurances to the Council that SCT's contract sum request was reasonable. This led to the Council approving the contract sum. Such an impasse has not happened subsequently.

### SCT financial performance

SCT has a track record of annual overspends and not achieving planned savings targets. The overspend in 2020/21 was approximately £2m, however one-off government COVID-19 funding resulted in the final outturn being an underspend. The Council has worked with SCT to re-profile the Trust's underlying overspend over the three years of the Council's current Medium-Term Financial Plan (MTFP).

Children's social care has significant demand pressures nationally, which have been exacerbated by COVID-19, and SCT has seen increased costs such as for placements for looked after children.

SCT did not deliver £250k of their planned savings target in 2020/21. SCT has a savings target of £1.8m in 2021/22. We have been advised that £1.3m of the planned £1.8m savings are on target to be achieved, with plans in place to deliver the remaining £500k. The savings primarily relate to staffing and placement costs, with the latter sensitive to increased demand.

SCT has Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to buy back services from the Council for specified back-office services. These SLAs total £2.1m for 2021/22 and represent an income to the Council.

### KLOE A1: Sandwell Children's Trust

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider actions undertaken by the Council to secure improvement in children's social care outcomes.

### **Council management of financial risks**

The Council's main source of monitoring the financial performance of SCT is via SCT reports to monthly meetings of OPB and quarterly meetings of SPB. SCT provides updates on forecast overspends and mitigations.

Given the financial pressures on SCT, the Council has set aside the following reserves and contingencies:

- High-cost placements reserve of £1m (£500k for 2022/23 and £500k for 2023/24) with SCT having to submit evidence should they claim for an additional contract sum.
- Earmarked COVID-19 reserve of £1.9m for 20201/22 which SCT claims against on a quarterly basis by demonstrating need. The additional £500k contract sum already mentioned was funded via this reserve.
- General contingency of £1.6m for 2021/22

#### Leadership and relationships

The CEO of SCT and the Council's Director of Children's Services (DCS) are key roles and their working relationship is critical to the effectiveness of SCT delivery. There had been stability in both roles until this year, with the Council's DCS leaving in August and a change to the SCT CEO in March. Since the DCS left the Council in August, an officer is acting up in the role of DCS, supported by an external interim. A new, permanent DCS is due to start in November 2021. The working relationship of the CEO of SCT and the Council's new permanent DCS will be critical going forward

This is particularly the case as the Council did not transfer all children's services to SCT, retaining direct provision of services such as education, SEND transport and children's centres. The Council is also responsible for other services such as housing and has a key role in supporting SCT in relation to early intervention and prevention, and in reducing demand for children's social care. This includes how the Council and SCT work with children and families and other local agencies such as the police. We note that the Children and Young People Strategic Partnership has not yet agreed an early help plan and associated performance framework. The role of the DCS will be critical in collaborating with partner organisations to reach agreement on this plan.

### SCT workforce

There have been a number of changes to SCT senior management including the Finance Director role and a restructure which reduced the number of Directors from three to two. However, the key workforce issue for SCT relates to operational roles with significant recruitment and retention challenges with social workers. SCT has invested in a recruitment campaign called 12 reasons to work in Sandwell but this has not been effective in resolving recruitment and retention issues, which we note is an issue for the West Midlands and children's social care nationally. The workforce are also initiative weary, which reflects the actions resulting from repeated Ofsted reviews.

Nonetheless, the use of agency staff to cover vacant roles, and staff sickness levels, pose a significant risk to the continuity and quality of service delivery, along with increasing costs for the Trust, which in turn is likely to impact on Council budgets.

### **Risk management**

The Council has SCT on its strategic risk register, and updates on this are provided to the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee. SCT is also included in the Children's Services departmental risk register.

SCT have adopted a risk management framework and maintain a risk register which is reviewed quarterly and is reported to the Trust's Audit Committee. SCT management report to OPB on key risks facing the trust such as those relating to financial, performance and quality risks. SCT management discuss key risks with Council management outside the monthly OPB meetings. However, SCT does not share its full risk register with the Council.

### KLOE A1: Sandwell Children's Trust (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider actions undertaken by the Council to secure improvement in children's social care outcomes.

### **Outcomes for children**

Ofsted inspections were suspended during COVID-19. The most recent focused visit was undertaken by Ofsted was in March 2021 which was reported in May 2021, which noted:

- Both the Council and SCT have risen to the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- The impact of the third lockdown and rising COVID-19 rates have had a significant impact on staffing, with increased staff turnover and sickness.
- The Trust continues to have serious weaknesses in some areas identified in previous inspections. Decisions that help to secure the living arrangements of children on a longterm basis are not timely, and placements are not always well matched. There is a lack of effective oversight and challenge to poor practice from team managers and independent reviewing officers. Support services to meet the mental health needs of care leavers are still not routinely in place.
- In some practice areas, not all managers have fully understood the full breadth of the issues, and this has impacted on the progress and pace of improvement. Many of the identified areas of weakness are longstanding and pre-date the pandemic. An understanding of practice deficits has not led to timely improvements and solutions for many children. The leadership team has plans in place to drive the required changes but has been slow to implement these successfully, and there is little evidence of impact.

During our review, in August 2021, Ofsted reviewed the fostering service which was rated Good. This was the first Good rating received by SCT and indicates positive progress is being made in relation to this service area. It also provides SCT with an opportunity of moving the narrative on its improvement trajectory, for example in relation to recruitment and retention issues.

#### **Conclusion and recommendations**

Whilst the recent Ofsted rating of fostering services demonstrates some positive progress, it is clear from the March 2021 Ofsted focus visit that some areas of significant improvement are still required. Staff turnover and quality of practice remain a risk to safeguarding children and the quality of their outcomes.

It is positive that Ofsted have reported the success of SCT and the Council's response to COVID-19, and we note that demand led pressures and recruitment and retention challenges are not unique to Sandwell.

However, during its time of operation SCT has struggled to move away from day-today firefighting and has not been able to invest in early intervention and prevention, or improve and transform to the extent required by the Council. Looked after children numbers and social worker caseloads, whilst both are reducing, remain high.

The statutory responsibly for children's social care sits with the Council via the role of the DCS. As such there is joint accountability for the successful delivery of services and outcomes for children. Relationships between the Council and SCT have on occasion been an "us and them" culture with a lack of collaborative approach and joint accountability.

The Council's senior leadership – both officer and member – should prioritise corporate effort and develop a clear strategy for working with SCT to ensure it remains on its improvement trajectory. This should include:

- working with SCT to progress a multi-agency early intervention and prevention strategy.
- ensuring SCT has an appropriately resourced and skilled placements team in place to effectively manage the care market.
- conducting a review of KPIs to ensure they are effective for current circumstances.
- undertaking financial benchmarking in relation to children's social care, and take a realistic and pragmatic view on the level of funding required.
- reviewing the governance roles of officers and members in relation to SCT so that they are clear on their responsibilities, avoid duplication, ensure effective communication and that there is a collective understanding of the performance of SCT and how risks and issues are being managed.

### **KLOE A2: Sandwell Leisure Trust**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's management of the contract with SLT and to understand the impact of recent industrial action.

### Background

Sandwell Leisure Trust (SLT) was formed by the Council in 2004 due to underperformance of the in-house leisure service. SLT was contracted via a Management and Funding Agreement (MFA) for a 30-year period: 2004 to 2034, and SLT is currently in the 18th contract year (1 April 2021 - 30 March 2022). SLT manage all Council leisure facilities apart from one site, for which the Council has contracted with Places Leisure.

Funding for SLT was agreed for the first five years of the contract, which was extended in 2009 and 2011. Thereafter the annual management fee paid to SLT has been based on the approval of a rolling three-year business plan. The Council remains responsible for maintaining and investing in the leisure assets managed by SLT.

When SLT was created Council staff transferred to the Trust under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE). A deed of variation was agreed in 2013 which permitted SLT to implement a separate single status agreement and move their staff from council terms and conditions of employment.

A deed of variation was agreed in 2016 that in the event of a new leisure facility being built in Smethwick to replace existing Smethwick facilities, SLT would be the operator. To that end SLT have been working with the Council as the assumed operator of the forthcoming Sandwell Aquatics Centre, which is being constructed as a venue for the 2022 Commonwealth Games.

### **OUR FINDINGS**

### Contract management

The MFA requires SLT to provide quarterly monitoring reports to the Council which is followed by a contract review meeting. The MFA sets out the KPIs for monitoring the contract. There have been attempts by the Council to update the KPIs during the delivery of the contract, for example to include outcomes such as contribution to the health outcomes in the borough, which has largely been unsuccessful. The key performance indicators are based on throughputs, such as the total number of visits, with a target to increase visits by 1% each year of the contract.

The contract with SLT stipulates an authorised officer from the Council should manage the contract and make decisions relating to the delivery of the contract. The long-standing officer in this role was seconded in January 2018 and a more junior officer was seconded to the authorised officer role. This has led to confusion within the Council and with SLT as to who is in the authorised officer role, due to more senior officers supporting the officer in the authorised role. This in turn has impacted on the agility of decision making by the Council and its effective working relationship with SLT. © 2021 Grant Thornton UK LLP | Value for Money – Governance Review | 2020/21

### SLT Business Plan

The MFA sets out that SLT should have at any one time a business plan agreed for a threeyear period, which the Council agrees on a rolling annual basis. The business plan for 2021/22 has been agreed, but the Council has not vet agreed the business plan covering 2022/23 to 2023/24, which should have been approved by end of March 2021.

If the Council and SLT fail to agree a business plan the contract resolution approach is instigated. The Council is currently seeking external legal advice to clarity the resolution process. If resolution can't be reached either party can terminate the contract.

The current impasse has resulted from the Council wanting, over a number of years, to significantly reduce the management fee for the contract, in the context of ongoing funding reductions to the Council, and the Trust demonstrating progress towards achieving financial sustainability and less reliance on Council funding. The Council and SLT have not been able to agree the level of funding for 2022/23 and 2023/24.

As part of this process the Council has sought various clarifications on the draft business plan submitted by SLT and has engaged, via Sport England, a consultant to review the Trust's financial position. A feature of recent business plan discussions has been the Council seeking details and clarifications from SLT relating to its financial position, such as the Trust's financial and management accounts, and the Trust's approach membership data and marketing plans. Both the Council and SLT feel there have been delays in the responsiveness from the other party during this period.

On 2 August 2021 SLT sent the Council an early warning letter highlighting financial concerns and a £750k worse than expected financial position for 2021/22 and 2022/23. SLT suggested that the impact of any changes were likely to increase the management fee requested for 2021/22.

The Council management met SLT management on 11 August 2021 and the Council confirmed areas of outstanding information and clarification. The Trust advised that their audited 2020/21 accounts would be presented to the SLT Board on 14 September 2021, and thereafter be shared with the Council. SLT management also advised that by reprofiling their budgets the £750k was no longer being sought.

At the time of concluding this review the business plan and funding agreement for 2022/23 and 2023/24 had not been approved. Typically, the process for negotiating the 2024/25 business plan would have recently started, to conclude by the end of March 2022.

### KLOE A2: Sandwell Leisure Trust (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's management of the contract with SLT and to understand the impact of recent industrial action.

### **Industrial relations**

SLT, in line with the 2013 deed of variation with the Council, went through a process of withdrawal from the National Joint Council (NJC) staff pay and conditions, which are those used by the Council, and which had transferred with staff when they TUPEd to SLT from the Council in 2014.

This decision was taken in November 2020, with staff needing to agree to the new terms and conditions. Council management have reported they felt they were not involved in this decision, whilst SLT management have advised the decision was taken to reduce costs, an issue which formed part of business plan negotiations.

SLT management negotiated with trade unions and the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) were brought in by SLT to help mediate. The trade unions sought industrial action to reverse the decision, which has led to two episodes of strike action during 2021.

GMB have ceased industrial action, whilst Unison have continued. 16 Unison members have taken strike action out of a total SLT workforce of over 400, and the most recent Unison ballot for strike action was due to conclude on 13 October 2021.

We understand that all SLT staff have now agreed to the new terms and conditions, which SLT management have confirmed will not be reviewed until April 2022.

The strike action has seen one leisure facility close on one occasion, with some services impacted at other leisure facilities.

#### **Conclusion and recommendation**

The Council has sought over many years, via the annual business planning and funding agreement process, for SLT to become more commercially innovative in its operations, and to reduce its reliance on Council funding. This has not been successful, and relationships between the Council and SLT have now broken down, reflected in the significant delays in approving the 2022/23 to 2023/34 business plan and associated funding agreement.

The ultimate responsibility for the operation of leisure services sits with the Council as the commissioner of SLT and, as with SCT, the Council has at times appeared to lose sight of this joint responsibility and an "us and them" culture has been in evidence.

At the time of finalising our report the Council has triggered the contract escalation procedure and written to SLT management for the Leader of the Council and the CEO of SLT to meet and agree a definitive timescale for resolution.

The Senior Leadership - both officer and member - must take ownership of this issue, prioritise corporate effort and take urgent steps to either resolve the current position with SLT or consider the options for alternative provision should either party decide to terminate the current contract, to ensure the continuity of future leisure service provision and associated reputational impacts.



### **KLOE A3: Providence Place**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the potential loss to the Council arising from the proposed sale of Providence Place.

### Background

In 2007 the Council signed a 15-year Strategic Partnership Agreement with BT for the provision of various support services. As part of this arrangement BT agreed a pre-let from a company called Stofords, the long-leaseholders of 1 Providence Place (Providence Place) for a term of 15 years at a rent of £1.2m per annum. Following the demise of this Strategic Partner Agreement the Council decided to take an assignment of this lease, thereby becoming tenants and inheriting the lease obligations. Simultaneously the Council sub-let part ground, first and fourth floors to BT on flexible terms (with breaks) at a rent starting at £605k ore annum (with uplifts).

In July 2014, Cabinet subsequently approved the purchase of the long leasehold interest in Providence Place at a cost of £23.558m. This purchase price was supported by an openmarket valuation by DTZ of the long leasehold interest. The valuation reflected the guaranteed income stream.

In June 2019, the Department for Education (DfE) approved the provision of a new, 750 place secondary free school in West Bromwich, to be delivered in partnership with Shireland Academy and the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra (CBSO). It was proposed that the Council sell the freehold interest of Providence Place with vacant possession, along with a development plot to the DfE. DfE would invest up to £17m in converting the building into a school, with a provisional completion date of September 2023. The Council considered that the building of the Academy and the basing of the CBSO in the area would have significant economic and cultural benefits.

The Council undertook an assessment of its property needs, reviewing its office estate and space requirement for office workers. It was decided that the Council no longer required the capacity offered by Providence Place and on 22 July 2020, the Cabinet approved that Providence Place was surplus to the Council's office accommodation requirements.

A receipt of £8.46m was generated from the sale of Providence Place to DfE, which was significantly below the acquisition price of £23.558m in 2014. This is because the building is being sold with vacant possession, without the benefit of a secure income stream. The sale price is based on a valuation report by Lambert Smith Hampton dated 17th March 2020. It is possible that the Council could have achieved the acquisition price if it had sold with a long-term tenant. The Council is still committed to making the loan and interest payments related to the initial purchase. The total remaining loan and interest (for the period 2021 to 2055) are £31.69m.

As part of our 2019/20 financial statements audit we considered the actions taken by the Council in both 2014 and 2020. When viewed separately the actions do not appear unreasonable. The 2014 decision to purchase the asset with a long leasehold interest was based on external valuations at market value. Similarly, the sale to DfE was at the current market value based on there being no long leasehold in place.

However, when viewed together it is clear that the Council made a significant loss on the basis of these decisions. We estimated that the direct loss against the 2014 purchase price of Providence Place was c. £15m (Purchase price £23m, sale price £8.46m). We also noted that future loan and interest payments of £31m need to be made (against which only the capital receipt arising from the sale of £8.46m can be set). In effect the total loss to the Council is c£22.5m. This is a significant loss. We note that the Council has received rents from BT totalling £5.386m and it has also had beneficial occupation of part ground, second and third floors since 2014. However, it would also have incurred maintenance and running costs for the building.

Our 2019/20 audit findings report (AFR) considered the reasons for such a significant loss. Whilst difficult to determine we considered that:

- greater challenge should have been applied to the original purchase price, especially
  as the price paid appears to reflect a long leasehold period but break clauses existed in
  the leases.
- the original purchase was intended to support the Council's Office Accommodation Strategy. It was envisaged that by 2017, the Council's workforce would reduce by 20-30% and the premises could then be used to accommodate more staff from less efficient buildings, thereby rationalising the use of council assets. The later change in the estates strategy with Providence Place being considered to be surplus has significantly undermined the original basis on which it was purchased.

We noted that, as Providence Place was being sold at its current market value and the decision to purchase it was made in 2014 we do not consider that the sale impacts on our 2019/20 VfM conclusion. However, due to the significance of the loss we have raised this matter with the Chief Executive to ensure that future purchases or sales of land and property are clearly aligned with a long-term estate strategy. Our AFR recommended that management should ensure that all purchases and sales of assets are clearly aligned with the Council's accommodation strategy.

### KLOE A3: Providence Place (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the potential loss to the Council arising from the proposed sale of Providence Place.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

The purchase and disposal of Providence Place went through the Council's governance and decision-making processes in place at these times, drawing on external property consultants and valuations advice.

Following the approach by DfE, and the Council determining there was no longer a use for Providence Place for office accommodation, an options appraisal was undertaken which was reported to Cabinet and Scrutiny. This options appraisal considered options in relation to Providence Place such as disposing of the site on the open market, retaining and leasing the property, and the Council funding the school instead of DfE.

The Council has a statutory duty to provide appropriate levels of school places, but the options appraisal did not consider alternative options for the location of the Academy outside of West Bromwich. Similarly, the options appraisal also did not represent a formal costbenefit-analysis between alternate sites outside of West Bromwich. We note that other sites suggested by the DfE within West Bromwich would have impacted the highway network and / or led to financial loss by the Council.

We note that if an alternative site was approved, the Council could have continued to utilise the building or alternatively may have been able to lease the building on a long-term basis thereby reducing the loss incurred.

The Council's post pandemic workplace vision and strategy supported the Council's decision that it no longer had a use for Providence Place for office accommodation. Providence Place would then become solely a commercial property investment, and it is not clear how the decision taken to dispose of Providence Place formed part of the Council's property strategy including an asset disposal strategy.

#### **British Telecom Lease**

The Council agreed to dispose of Providence Place in August 2020 and contracts were exchanged with DfE provided that the Council agreed to the surrender of BT's lease by 30 June 2021 in order to vacate the building. BT held the lease until 2026 and had no contractual obligation to move. On 6 June 2021 Cabinet agreed to the terms of BT surrendering their lease at Providence Place.

These terms included the Council having no obligation to provide BT with alternative accommodation, the Council would pay BT a surrender premium equivalent to one year's rent of £446.4k + VAT, BT would be waived liability for dilapidation and decommissioning works and the Council would be liable for BT's legal costs for surrender. Contracts would be exchanged by the end of June 2021 and BT's surrender date be 31 December 2021 to satisfy the Council's obligations with DfE. The costs to the Council would be funded via a sinking fund for Providence Place to cover unforeseen costs.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

As stated as part of our 2019/20 financial statements audit we considered the action taken by the Council in both 2014 and 2020. Viewed separately the actions do not appear unreasonable. The 2014 decision to purchase the asset with a long leasehold interest was based on external valuations at market value. Similarly, the sale to DfE was at the current market value based on there being no long leasehold in place. However, when viewed together it is clear that the Council made a significant loss on the basis of these decisions.

Property transactions such as those relating to Providence Place are complex. Where the Council considers similar transactions in future, those charged with making decisions must satisfy themselves that they fully understand the detail of the options being proposed. Council officers and their advisors have a responsibility to ensure that members making decisions do so having fully understood these complexities and risks.

The Council should ensure that all future property or land acquisitions and disposals are clearly aligned with relevant Council property related strategies.

### **KLOE A4: SEND Transport**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the circumstances relating to the recent procurement of SEND Transport and the Council's current approach to concluding the procurement.

### Background

The Council's Special Education Needs and Disabilities Passenger Transport (SEND Transport) contract expired at the end of August 2021. Currently 19 operators deliver 122 contracts which are in place to meet the Council's statutory duty under Section 508B and Schedule 35B of the Education Act 1996, whereby local authorities are under a statutory duty to provide free school transport to eligible children.

The Council's budget for the provision of SEND Transport was significantly under pressure with a forecast spend of  $\pounds$ 6.1m in 2020/21 against a budget of  $\pounds$ 2.5m. This was caused by a combination of factors, in particular increasing demand.

The Council undertook a procurement exercise, pursuant to its Procurement and Contract Procurement Procedure Rules in relation to a new SEND Transport Contract for 2021-25 (the new Contract) to award a new contract – at a potential total cost of £22m over four years. The Council sought to achieve greater economies of scale and value for money alongside addressing new and emerging issues within the sector including the risk of modern-day slavery, and improving the overall delivery of the service .

In August 2020, the Council's Cabinet approved the establishing of a new Dynamic Purchasing System (DPS) for the new Contract. A DPS was used for the existing SEND Transport contract. Following stage one of the new DPS, a closed bidder tender process was undertaken as stage 2 in March and April 2021. An evaluation of the proposals took place and a Cabinet Report was prepared setting out the conclusion of the evaluation, and the recommended awarding passenger transport related contracts via the new DPS effective as from 1 September 2021.

The Council's Cabinet, at its meeting on 16 June 2021, considered the award of four lots as the outcome of the procurement, which would have provided a £300k saving on the previous contract as well as improving service quality. The Cabinet deferred the matter following various concerns being raised over the process which had been raised following the publication of Cabinet papers prior to the meeting taking place.

An internal audit fact finding exercise regarding the proposed award of the SEND Transport Contracts for 2021-25 was then undertaken.

The Council took external legal advice on the options available, and an emergency Cabinet meeting took place on 21 July 2021 which agreed to continue to use the existing contracts with providers for the continued provision of SEND transport until 23rd February 2022, in order that the Council meets its statutory duties.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

### **Internal Audit review**

Internal Audit undertook a review, reporting in June 2021, which examined the background to and decision making relating to the 2021-25 contracts, compliance with the Council's procurement and contract rules, the approach adopted to supplier inclusion to DPS and the associated tender, how the outcome of the tender evaluation was reported to Members, and considered if any inappropriate or fraudulent activity had taken place. This report noted:

- Some of the concerns raised related to the identity of the owner of the two companies initially selected as the successful bidders, and the fact he was a former employee of the Council and the son of a former Deputy Leader, who was investigated into a series of land sales involving the Council (known as the Wragge report). As neither individual had any known current role or association with the Council they did not form part of the scope of the review.
- Many of the concerns were raised by current suppliers of this service to the Council that have not been successful in the latest procurement exercise, so there would be an element of potential disappointment and disgruntlement behind parts of them. However, each of the concerns were dealt with objectively, and in certain cases they were found not to be fully accurate in their interpretation. For example, a number of officers from both procurement and the service area were involved in the assessment process.

The internal audit report concluded:

- · The procurement was undertaken with the correct intentions.
- Some concerns and issues raised have an element of substance.
- A number of issues regarding the quality of certain information provided by bidders in support of their applications
- A number of key Council processes were not followed. In particular the need for officers involved in the exercise to formally declare if they have any potential conflict of interests, the completion of a Starting a Procurement form which captures key information from the outset, and to respond to bidder's applications within agreed timescales. However, while internal procedures within service areas had not always been followed, none of these were in themselves a direct breach of the Council's Procurement and Contract Procedure Rules.

### KLOE A4: SEND Transport (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the circumstances relating to the recent procurement of SEND Transport and the Council's current approach to concluding the procurement.

### **KEY FINDINGS** (cont'd)

- Sufficient documented consideration does not appear to have been given to both financial modelling and the risks, particularly around resilience, associated with the potential placing of all four large contracts with just two companies, who in themselves come under the ownership of one individual.
- None of the officers interviewed indicated that they had been placed under any pressure by any other officer or elected member as part of the procurement exercise.
- While the significant reduction in lots would see a subsequent reduction in the number of companies the Council would be contracting with, from the evidence available to them, Internal Audit found nothing to suggest that the reduction of competition was undertaken with the sole aim of benefitting two particular companies. Similarly, they came across no evidence to suggest that any inappropriate or fraudulent activity had taken place.

The Internal Audit report concluded that the issues identified in the review in all likelihood will necessitate a need to revisit the procurement exercise. In particular the way in which use was made of the DPS including restricting the number of lots available, how initial decision making was considered, agreed and recorded, and how information and the lack of detail thereof, was relayed back to the Cabinet in order for them, and later Scrutiny, to make an informed decision, on what is in effect a £20m contract award.

#### **Other reviews**

The Council's Corporate and Budget Scrutiny Board and the Children's Services and Education Board have agreed to jointly examine existing and proposed arrangements for SEND transport provision. The Council's Audit and Risk Assurance Committee Chair is undertaking a fact-finding exercise into the original procurement exercise. Both activities had not been concluded during the course of our review.

The Council sought to commission an independent review of the original procurement. This review planned to assess the compliance and probity of the original procurement, including re-running the evaluation stage This did not proceed due there being only one bidder, and the cost being deemed not best value.

### **Financial management**

Since 2018 the overall cost of providing travel assistance including parent mileage, travel passes and more recently the offer of personal travel budgets has increased by 45% from £3m in 2018/19 to a projected cost of £6.4m for 2021/22. Over the same period SEND pupils requiring travel assistance has increased from 680 to 850 with the average cost per pupil increasing from £5.1k pa to £7.6k pa. This situation is not unique to the Council.

The pressure on the SEND Transport budget has been managed over recent years by using carried forward underspends in the Education Directorate budget or using one off contributions from reserves. These were fully utilised by the end of March 2021 and the Council agreed additional funding for 2021/22 with the budget increased to £5.6m. A projected budget pressure of £800k remains, which excludes the impact of continuing with the existing DPS framework from September 2021 to February 2022.

The Council's approach to managing the overspends prior to 2021/22 mean that the base budget for SEND Transport did not reflect the true cost of providing the service. This led to some of the criticisms in relation to the value of the planned procurement award.

The extension of the original DPS contract by six months has seen an increase in forecast costs for the service

#### **Delegation and communication**

Cabinet approved the procurement approach at its meeting in August 2020, delegating the detailed design, including lot structure, to the Travel Assistance Service team, working with the procurement and legal teams, with the procurement team managing the overall procurement process

A key change to the existing DPS framework, which focused on costs, was to introduce a greater focus on quality in the new DPS framework, in relation to children's safeguarding, and employment practices.

### KLOE A4: SEND Transport (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the circumstances relating to the recent procurement of SEND Transport and the Council's current approach to concluding the procurement.

### Delegation and communication (cont'd)

Whilst the teams involved in developing the new contract design were aware of the planned service quality benefits, such as improved safety standards, reliability and quality of the service, more could have been done to ensure key decision makers were aware of the reasons for the change and the planned benefits when the new procurement approach was discussed and agreed in August 2020, and prior to the planned approval in June 2021, noting the significant changes to members of the Cabinet between these two dates.

A comparison between providers used on the current contract with those who were being proposed to be awarded contracts via the new DBS framework may have also helped managed a more effective contract award discussion.

### The publication of the proposed award

The Council chose to include the recommendations for the award of the new DPS contracts on the public part of the agenda papers for the Cabinet meeting on 16 June 2021, including the results of the evaluation. This was the direct cause of challenges being made to members of Cabinet prior to the meeting taking place. It is unusual for such potentially commercially sensitive information being made public in advance of a decision being made on the award of a major contract.

The outcome of the June Cabinet meeting has significantly impacted on the Council's reputation, including the matter being raised in Parliament, and has further impacted on the relationship between officers and members including levels of trust. The pausing of the procurement has also increased the level of expenditure on the services placing further pressure on the Council's budget, and creates risks for the Council such as accusations of suppliers canvassing members during the intervening period.

#### **Conclusion of the procurement**

The procurement of the contract was initially paused, pending the outcome of the various reviews being undertaken. However, in order to not have to further extend the current DPS contract, work has been undertaken, including obtaining external legal advice, to review the structuring of the lots, and to consider whether the new DPS framework will be used. A report is planned to be presented to Cabinet on 3 November 2021 to agree how to proceed.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The focus of service quality in the new DPS framework represents important and positive progress for the Council in managing a major contract of this type. However, weaknesses have been identified by Internal Audit in some aspects of the procurement approach, although these did not represent a breach of the Council's Procurement and Contract Procedure Rules.

The manner of the pausing of the procurement has damaged the Council's reputation, put further strain on officer and member relationships, and created uncertainty and risks over how the conclusion of the procurement will be viewed and opened the Council up to potential legal challenges.

The Council already uses a DPS for commissioning travel assistance services, so has familiarity with the approach, as do providers. Whilst not the only procurement option, DPS is considered an appropriate procurement approach for a public sector organisation procuring services of this type. Operators can bid to be appointed to lots on the framework, and if unsuccessful continue to try do so by meeting the Council's service standards. When the Council requires a service, operators on the DPS framework are asked to tender for the work.

This was a major and complex procurement. An Invitation to Tender was advertised on 12 March 2021, with a closing date of 2 April 2021, for the contract to go live on 1 September 2021. This time frame was inadequate for such a large and complex contract.

The Council's senior leadership – both officers and members – must place priority on agreeing the outcome of the SEND Transport procurement exercise to ensure a further contract extension is not required. This should include:

- Not losing the significant progress made on the contract specification's focus on service quality.
- Greater support, involvement, dialogue and oversight with the officer teams with responsibility for progressing the procurement.
- Ensuring the contract provides the Council with effective management and oversight of the personal transport market.

### KLOE A4: SEND Transport (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the circumstances relating to the recent procurement of SEND Transport and the Council's current approach to concluding the procurement.

### **Recommendations (cont'd)**

For the conclusion of the SEND Transport procurement and for all future major procurements, the Council should ensure that:

- Record keeping and declarations of interest are undertaken in line with Council policies and procedures.
- Decision making does not create real or perceived risks in relation to inappropriate procurement decisions.
- Procurement timescales provide adequate time for both suppliers to submit high quality bids, and the Council to undertake appropriate evaluation, scrutiny and decision making. This timescale should include appropriate time in advance of the procurement for the council to undertake the necessary strategic thinking and planning required, and mitigate the risk of not making an award in the planned timescale



### **KLOE A5: Sandwell Land and Property**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the background to the establishment of the company, actions undertaken by the Council to ensure the company complies with legislation, and delays to winding down the company.

### Background

Sandwell Land and Property (SLaP) was incorporated on 14 January 2011 as a limited company. SLaP was established by the Council as a vehicle for protecting the freehold of the Council's schools and related sites. SLaP is a non trading company and has no employees.

The Council is the sole shareholder of the company. SLaP is the freeholder of 99 education assets and leases them to the Council for a nominal sum of £1 per year in the form of ground rent, with the Council responsible for the maintenance of the assets as a condition of the lease.

Our 2019/20 Audit Findings Report noted that we have had extensive discussions with officers around the accounting for SLaP property and around the history and purpose of the company.

We agreed with management's view that the company should be wound up as soon as possible and that Council representatives should discuss with the Directors of the company the ongoing purpose of the company and whether it could continue in its current form. We requested additional assurances around the security of schools' assets should the company be wound up before a decision is made on the future of the company, with the company expected to be wound up during 2021/22.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

#### Reason for creating the company

At the time of establishing SLaP, the Council understood that new legislation relating to academy schools created a risk that schools converting to academy status could take over the freehold of the Council's education assets. On taking external legal advice after establishing SLaP it was confirmed the freehold of education assets would not pass to academies.

Given the cost and additional complexity of managing an arm's length company arrangement, it is unclear why the Council has not sought to take education assets back in house sooner.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

### **Compliance with legislation**

The company and its Directors are governed by Company Acts law. There is evidence that the Directors of the company were not familiar with their legal responsibilities in relation to proper record keeping and failing to meet statutory deadlines for example submitting company accounts.

A number of Council members and officers have been appointed to company Director roles during the period of the company's operation, with one Director in place at the time of this review.

SLaP has never formally appointed a company secretary. A former Council Chief Executive, when a Director of the company, undertook the company secretary role informally. When they left their Director role in January 2019 it has been unclear who has subsequently delivered this role.

The administration of the company's business has been undertaken by officers of the Council, such as legal and finance, supporting members in company director roles, including an understanding of their company roles and obligations. We have not been able to confirm if formal guidance and training has ever been provided to company Directors. This has created a risk that Directors have not fully understood their legal responsibilities, including the distinction between the Council as shareholder and leaseholder, and SLaP as freeholder of the education assets.

The company was created without secretary of state consent, the Council has subsequently sought counsel advice that broadly indicated that if no government challenge had arisen, it was not likely to occur.

The company's accounts have been qualified in relation to asset valuations and ownership. We note that shares in the company were not issued in accordance with the relevant legislation.

#### **Council's governance arrangements**

SLaP is a risk on the Education Service risk register, but has not had a profile with the Council's senior leadership, and nor has there been a senior individual, since the former Chief Executive left the Council, with effective understanding and organisational oversight of the company.

### KLOE A5: Sandwell Land and Property (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the background to the establishment of the company, actions undertaken by the Council to ensure the company complies with legislation, and delays to winding down the company.

### **Current position**

The Council has appointed external legal advisors to advise on the winding up of the company. The legal advisors are advising both the Council as shareholder and leaseholder, and the company in the form of the company director.

In October 2021 the Cabinet acting as shareholder of the company approved instruction to the SLaP director to pursue voluntary liquidation. An insolvency practitioner has been engaged to administer the winding up of the company. The insolvency practitioner has appointed a tax advisor to advise on any tax implications and has advised the Council that due to the nature of the company and the company's assets, they are able to transfer the assets to the Council on the basis of their indemnity as liquidator, ensuring they are not responsible for any liabilities identified during the winding up process.

The Council's legal team is reviewing the legal title and beneficial interests of each asset to ensure the Council will have legal title when transferred from SLaP, and whether beneficial interests sit with the Council or, for example if this should be transferred to another body such a governing body of a school. Should such examples be identified, the beneficial interests should have been transferred prior to the asset being transferred to SLaP.

The winding up process had not concluded at the time of our review.

#### **Conclusions and recommendation**

The Council has incurred additional costs to set up, administer and wind up SLaP when the purpose of establishing the company proved to be unnecessary.

There has been significant weaknesses in the understanding of roles and responsibilities, between those acting on behalf of the Council and those acting on behalf of the company. There has been a lack of consistent senior leadership oversight of the company, highlighted by delays in progressing its winding up. There are a number of instances where the relevant legislation has not been followed, such as the issue of shares.

The Council should ensure that when considering establishing an arm's length company in the future there is a clear purpose for doing so and that those officers / members of the Council in company director roles are clear of their role and responsibilities in relation to that company.

Where arms length companies already exist the Council should gain assurances that company directors fully understand their company roles and responsibilities, that the company administration is properly resourced and appropriate training is provided to company directors. The purpose of the company should be revisited on a regular basis to determine whether the company continues to be of benefit to the Council.



### **KLOE A6: MADE Festival**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the governance arrangements and decision making relating to the Council hosting this festival.

### Background

The Council was approached by the organisers of the MADE music festival, for the potential to use Sandwell Valley, a Council owned site, as the venue for the festival, to be held in August 2020. MADE festival was established in 2014 with aims of celebrating West Midlands contemporary music, creative arts and street food.

The Council agreed to host the event, recognising its alignment to the Council's ambition to strengthen Sandwell Valley's identity as a 'destination gateway' into the Sandwell / West Midlands region, and as part of the wider proposals for establishing Sandwell Valley as future major festival site. The event would generate income for the Council of £18,000-£20,000 for hosting the festival.

Due to the subsequent outbreak of COVID-19 the festival was postponed in 2020, to take place on 31 July and 1 August 2021. The ongoing pandemic during 2021 and uncertainty regarding the timing of changes to government guidelines led to a late decision not to allow the festival to take place on the rescheduled dates. This led to a breakdown in relationship with the festival promoter, who considered legal action against the Council, a situation which was resolved with the festival ultimately taking place on 18 and 19 September 2021.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

The original decision to host the festival was made by the then Leader of the Council on 15 January 2020. The Council's events team managed the planning for the event, including liaising with other relevant statutory bodies such as the police, via the Council's Statutory Advisory Group (SAG). SAG also had a role to ensure the Council's statutory responsibilities were met in relation to issues such as safety, traffic management and licencing permissions.

In the months and weeks prior to the rescheduled 2021 event taking place SAG received updates on all events due to take place in the borough, those hosted by the Council and those hosted by other bodies. During this period there remained uncertainty over the timing and nature of the government's four stage road map for easing COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, and because of this there were delays in formally approving that the MADE festival could take place as planned, with government delaying until 19 July when all legal limits on social contact in England would be removed.

The Council's Strategic Incident Management Team (SIMT) which was set up to consider various COVID-19 related activities, considered the viability of the rescheduled 2021 event. This included infection rates and vaccine take up in the borough, and the risks associated with the high level of visitor numbers expected to attend the event . SIMT comprised the majority of Directors on the Council's Leadership Team and relevant Heads of Service.

SIMT raised concerns about the viability of holding the event on 31 July and 1 August which were shared with event organisers and promoter at a meeting on 23 June 2021.

The event promoter advised the Council that should restrictions lift on 19 July 2021 and the event was not permitted to go ahead it would have serious consequences on the future sustainability of the event.

On 30 June at a further meeting the Council advised the organisers that the Council was not able to grant permission for the event to proceed as scheduled, until the Council had seen and interpreted the revised government regulations and guidance after 19 July 2021 and assess the COVID-19 safety of the event. The Council advised the organisers that these timescales meant it would be unwise for them to advance their current plans and a later date should be considered for the event.

The Council received a COVID-19 risk assessment from the organisers on 6 July which was reviewed by the Director of Public Health and discussed with the portfolio holder for Strong and Resilient Communities. Both raised concerns about holding the event on the planned days. The organisers requested the opportunity to submit a revised proposal for the event to take place on 18 and 19 September 2021.

On 13 July the Council became aware that tickets were being advertised by the promoter for the event on the planned event days and queried with the organisers why the event was being promoted. The Council then received a letter from the promotor's solicitors seeking Council justification for the decision to postpone, believing the Council had approved the event booking. The Council sought counsel advice, as the event booking form had a disclaimer in relation to COVID-19 and, in its view, the organisers had not provided all relevant documentation, for example, in relation to road closures.

The organisers also undertook negotiations with an alternative site outside of the borough which proved unsuccessful. The promoter advised the Council that the financial impact of not holding the event as planned could result in bankruptcy and he would consider taking legal action against the Council seeking recovery of costs.

The Council met the organisers on 22 July to discuss alternate September dates and the promoter announced the postponement of the event the following day.

### KLOE A6: MADE Festival (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the governance arrangements and decision making relating to the Council hosting this festival.

### **KEY FINDINGS** (cont'd)

SAG met on 26 July to consider the alternate September dates and confirmed with the organisers on 29 July approval for the new dates, subject to satisfactory finalisation of all relevant plans and compliance with terms and conditions of booking.

The event took place on 18 and 19 September 2021.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

There was uncertainty on the timing and detail of government regulations relating to the staged removal of lockdown restrictions being faced by all organisations and individuals during this period. However, the Council demonstrated a lack of decisiveness and clarity of decision making with the organisers of the event, with the governance around this decision making unclear.

The strategic reason for originally making the decision to host what was planned to be an annual event was its alignment to the Council's ambition to strengthen Sandwell Valley's identity as a 'destination gateway' into the Sandwell / West Midlands region, and as part of the wider proposals for establishing Sandwell Valley as future major festival site. We note that the Council's relationship with the organisers has been negatively impacted by how the decision making process was managed. There is a risk that the organisers may not seek the borough as a venue for future events.

As part of the planned review of the scheme of delegation the Council should ensure that there is clarity of decision making on hosting events, and that the governance arrangements relating to such decisions are effective and clearly communicated.



### **KLOE A7: Waste service**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the performance of the waste service, the Council's management of the contract with Serco, and understand the impact of recent industrial relations issues.

### Background

The Council chose to outsource its waste and recycling service and in November 2010, following a procurement exercise, the Council confirmed the appointment of a consortium led by Serco to deliver a 25 year, £650m integrated waste and recycling services contract. Council staff were transferred to Serco under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE).

Serco are responsible for the collection of household food and garden waste and recycling, street cleansing, the associated vehicle fleet, and the household recycling centre (HRC).

During the course of COVID-19 the Council has become increasingly concerned about the performance of a number of aspects relating to the delivery of the contract.

Service delivery has also been impacted by industrial action from some of the Serco workforce.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

#### **Contract management**

The contract includes 34 Key Output Targets (KOTs) which are the basis for contract performance management. The contract is self-monitoring and Serco provide the Council with monthly performance data. Penalty points are accrued for failure to meet KOTs and these are reviewed each month by the Council, with financial penalties based on penalty points accrued each month. Failure to regularly meet KOTs over a twelve-month period can trigger a contractual default. There have been no defaults during the contract to date.

There had been formal contract monitoring meetings every six months between the Council and Serco in the form of a Waste Management Board. The Council Leader and relevant portfolio holder attend these board meetings and the Board is the formal decision making body. The Board meetings were suspended as a result of the onset of COVID-19 but have been subsequently re-introduced on a three-monthly basis.

The KOT in relation to recycling rates sets out a sliding scale of annual improved rates, with 60% being the target for 2021 and the actual rate being 32%. This is calculated on the tonnage of recycling against refuse collected. Serco have failed to meet these annual targets and may incur financial penalties of up to £1.2m per year. The reasons for under achievement of the target are considered to be household behaviour and weekly collections, the latter forming part of the original contract specification. The Council has provided Serco with a letter of comfort reducing this target and reducing the annual financial penalty.

The Serco contract was the first major outsourcing of its type undertaken by the Council. There is a perception that the approach to managing the contract did not adequately change from the way these services were managed when the Council operated a direct labour organisation model. Over the past ten years of the contract there have been a limited number of contract variations and requests made for additional services were not effectively specified.

The KOTs are considered well defined, but they are generally based on annual quantity rather than frequency and service quality. The Council is intending to engage an external consultant to review the KOTs to determine whether these contract specifications can be amended.

The vehicle workshop is operated by the Council and the Council maintains the vehicles through a separate maintenance contract with Serco. The contract terms meant that Serco were to replace fleet vehicles after 8 years of the contract (five years for smaller vehicles) which did not happen. This was identified during 2018 and discussions were held between the Council and Serco on whether the Council would borrow to fund the capital expenditure. The Council took external legal advice which confirmed such an action would represent state aid. A Fleet Board was introduced in May 2021 for Serco and the Council to progress a fleet replacement programme and Serco have committed to replace 18 refuse collection vehicles with delivery due in December 2021, as well as investing in mixed domestic recycling trucks. Serco have also hired newer sweeper vehicles, pending their replacement.

### **Financial management**

Serco submit a monthly bill in line with the contract payment mechanism.

In recent years the Council's budgets for waste management has underspent and an underspend is forecast for 2021/22. The underspend is a result of financial penalties incurred by Serco, and income the Council receives from recyclate sales. The prices for the latter are dependent on market fluctuations. The underspend is used to maintain a reserve, currently £3.5m, which is used to manage fluctuations in disposal market rates and contract fees.

### KLOE A7: Waste service (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the performance of the waste service, the Council's management of the contract with Serco, and understand the impact of recent industrial relations issues.

### Service performance

COVID-19 impacted on service delivery – which was common across the sector – as the workforce were impacted by absences, for example due to self-isolation via shielding or because of other COVID-19 regulations, as well as social distancing measures introduced for those who were at work. Garden and food waste collection were suspended during the first lockdown and the HRC was closed. Serco is still not operating a full service in particular food waste collection.

The pandemic has impacted on both waste collection and street cleansing, with street cleansing staff backfilling waste collection roles. Vehicle reliability has also contributed to service performance.

The pandemic shone a light on working practices and performance at Serco, contributing to service performance issues. During 2021 Council management have taken action to work with Serco to ensure necessary improvements are introduced. We understand, that as a result Serco's performance management of poor performing crews has improved, which has led to suspension of some staff and others leaving. This has contributed to industrial relations issues.

In early October the 100% in-day completion of waste collection rounds was achieved for the first time in approximately 9 months.

Serco have developed a waste and recycling recovery plan, and a recovery plan for street cleansing. At the time of this review they were being appraised by Council officers and were to be approved by the Waste Management Board.

#### **Industrial relations**

Council staff were TUPE'd to Serco on the council's terms and conditions for the first ten years of the contract. Industrial relations issues arose in May 2021 when trade unions (Unite, Unison and GMB) raised issues with Serco management in relation to staff grievances, salary benchmarking, health and safety concerns and staff complaints relating to bullying.

We understand that Serco management have investigated the complaints and have concluded that the staff complaints related to management seeking to improve working practices and did not represent bullying. Serco management have also investigated staff grievances and health safety concerns and believe these to be resolved. Unite and Unison agree, but GMB believe they remain unresolved.

The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) are involved in arbitration with GMB. At the time of this review strike action was planned and GMB introduced a 2-month overtime ban for their members. 120 of the 300 workforce are GMB members. Serco's senior management continue to engage GMB to try to bring resolution to the dispute.

### Leadership and staff continuity

There have been changes to the senior officers at the Council with the relevant Executive Director and Director leaving in the past twelve months. An interim Director has been in role since May 2021 with a permanent Director due to start in November 2021. Until the interim Director was in role there was inadequate senior officer involvement in relation to the contract at time when this was needed to manage Serco's contract performance during the pandemic. The interim Director has brought focus to the situation including engaging with senior management of Serco.

The Council's contract manager has been in role for seven years. There had been similar stability in this role at Serco until there were changes in early 2020. More generally there have been a high number of management changes at Serco over the past year including the regional manager, regional managing director, operations manger and the senior contract manager. These changes have led to a lack of continuity in relationships with the Council and impacted on effective partnership working. In August 2021 a new senior contract manager and operations manager started but both left in September. The Serco managing director has introduced a new structure responding to concerns raised by the Council, and has instigated a programme of staff engagement. Serco are also taking steps to better manage poor performing staff, which is also leading to some further staff changes.

As noted elsewhere in this report, the Council's Leadership Team has not received effective corporate monitoring information on key council service indicators, which includes the Serco contract. This has been recognised and changes are being made to address the situation.

### KLOE A7: Waste service (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the performance of the waste service, the Council's management of the contract with Serco, and understand the impact of recent industrial relations issues.

#### **Other findings**

The performance issues associated with the Serco contract have seen an increase in complaints from residents, and increased enquiries to the Council's contact centre. Fly tipping has increased in the borough and the closure of, and then waiting time delays at, the household recycling centre are considered a contributory factor.

There is a need to review enforcement of public realm issues so the Council is clearer if the ownership sits with Serco or Council services such as parks, housing and grounds maintenance.

On 22 July 2021 the Council's Economy Skills Transport and Environment Scrutiny Board agreed to carry out a review of Waste Services and the Cleanliness of the Borough. The working group undertaking the review had not reported at the time of producing this report

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

Serco have not brought the innovation and investment expected by the Council, and the culture of the workforce has impacted on Serco's ability to deliver the contract. Whilst there are issues relating to Serco management, it is only recently that Council management have taken a robust approach to managing poor contract performance, which has led to some performance improvement. Serco remains on an improvement journey.

The Council should prioritise corporate effort to ensure that the recovery plans are approved and appropriate senior management oversight is given to monitoring their effective delivery.

The Council should ensure robust contract management arrangements are in place, and review the Key Output Targets (KOTs) and work with Serco to ensure they are line with Council expectations and the data is available to allow effective monitoring of contract outcomes.

The Council should ensure that the investments specified in the contract with Serco are made, such as a new vehicle fleet.



### KLOE A9: Lion Farm

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's governance arrangements and decision making in relation to the Lion Farm development.

#### Background

Following approval of the Asset Management Land Disposal Cabinet Committee (AMLDCC) at its meeting on 19 December 2012, the Council entered into an option agreement with a local developer in respect of the proposed development of Lion Farm Playing Fields in Oldbury (Lion Farm). The proposed development related to a premium designer outlet centre, which could support significant economic, environmental and social benefits to the borough and wider region. The minutes of the AMLDCC were received by Cabinet on 9 January 2013 and full Council on 5 March 2013.

An option agreement is a legally biding agreement that gives a potential developer a period within which to investigate the development of a site and the owner of the site agrees to sell the land to the developer at a future point, Any costs incurred by the developer during the option period are at the developer's risk.

The option agreement was dated 21 May 2013 and the developer paid the Council an option fee of £245k plus a contribution to the Council's legal costs. The option agreement gave the developer the option to acquire the freehold of the Lion Farm site should planning permission be granted.

The agreement gave the developer 12 months to undertake pre-development activity with an option to extend for a further 12 months. The agreement also provided for a secondary option agreement to be entered into by the Council and the developer.

After the initial 12-month period in 2014 the Council approved the request to extend the agreement by a further 12 months. In 2015, before the second 12-month period had concluded the Council confirmed that the developer had complied with their obligations and the parties began discussing the secondary option agreement.

In 2017 the developer was made aware of a rival premium designer outlet scheme in Cannock that had received full planning permission. The developer approached the Council for approval to progress the development. On 15 November 2017 the Cabinet approved variation to the existing option agreement with conditions including resident consultation, reprovision of current football pitches, undertake an economic impact assessment, submit a full planning application, and the site should be developed as a premier retail/leisure development which will attract high-end outlets.

In 2018 the Council sought counsel advice on whether the options agreement was legal with the QC confirming in August 2018 that the options agreement was a legally binding decision.

#### Governance relating to the original decision

A review by the Council in 2018 identified governance weaknesses in relation to the original decision to grant the option agreement and made the following recommendations:

- Enhanced member training to improve awareness on declaration of interests.
- The need to ensure resolutions are enacted in a timely way the original AMLDCC decision requested a follow up report on progress which was not progressed until 2017 with a report to Cabinet.
- A clearer record of the decision-making process to support recommendations being made to members
- A new protocol for the disposal of Council owned land and buildings is developed.

#### **External review**

The Council engaged a consultancy firm to review the governance and decision making in relation to Lion Farm and three unrelated property transactions. They reported in January 2020. The report was not made available to us until we commenced this review.

We have reviewed the findings of the report but under the terms of its agreement with the Council we are unable to quote from this report. We are considering the powers available to us under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 to require the release of the report. However, to ensure the timely release of our report we have set out our overall conclusions below.

#### **Current position**

The Council's procurement regulations do not apply to property transactions, and so there is no legal requirement to publicly advertise the granting of an option to purchase a piece of land.

The principal senior officers and senior members involved in the initial agreement are no longer Council employees or a member of the Council. We note that there were weaknesses in record keeping, which means the current senior officers do not have access to all the information relating to the original decision.

### KLOE A9: Lion Farm (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's governance arrangements and decision making in relation to the Lion Farm development.

#### Current position (cont'd)

The secondary options agreement has not concluded and the developer has not yet submitted a planning application.

As a result of the 2013 options agreement, the asset will be valued following planning approval, before its disposal.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The original sale of the option to develop Lion Farm with a limit of 12 months to put a development forward appears reasonable. Subsequent decisions to extend the secondary option negotiations without an end date were ill-judged. It has meant that the Council has little recourse with the developer.

There has been a lack of recent engagement with the developer and the situation has been allowed to drift with the senior leadership of the Council not placing priority on seeking to agree resolution and a way forward. We understand that the Interim Chief Executive has recently re-started dialogue with the developer and is placing priority on resolving the impasse, and an options appraisal is being prepared for the Cabinet to consider.

The Council must ensure that the recent re-engagement with the developer results in agreeing a clear way forward, including an action plan and timescale so there is clarity on the responsibilities for the Council and developer in order to progress the finalisation of the secondary option agreement, or to be clear on the legal process for both parties extricating themselves from the agreement and the associated terms.

The Council must ensure that it has taken all necessary steps to ensure that arrangements are in place so that issues identified in the external review are appropriately mitigated and managed.

The Council should review its procurement regulations and consider updating them to include land sales, including options agreements, to ensure that best value can be achieved.



### **KLOE A10: Introduction of new ERP System**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's management of the introduction of Oracle Fusion and understanding implementation delays and their impact.

#### Background

The main Enterprise and Resource Planning (ERP) business system currently used by the Council is Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS), which provides a range of key functions that support various service areas, including Finance, Human Resources, Payroll, and Procurement. The Council's EBS is also used by maintained schools in the borough, Sandwell Children's Trust and the West Midlands Fire Service. It has been in place since 2003.

The current version of EBS used by the Council will become unsupported from 31 December 2021. Remaining on unsupported software is considered an unacceptable risk to the Council due to the loss of support patches from Oracle. The Council agreed to replace EBS in 2019. This decision followed an options appraisal, which concluded that a new cloud-based ERP system would be the preferred option.

The Council decided that Oracle Corporation UK Ltd were the only suitable available provider – their Oracle Fusion product. An exemption from conducting a formal tender process, to allow negotiation with Oracle for purchase of the appropriate licences, was considered permissible under the provision of the Public Contracts Regulation 2015. The Council published a voluntary ex-ante notice to inform the market of its intention to conclude these negotiations with Oracle and meet its obligations for compliance with the 2015 Regulation.

The Council also agreed to engage an implementation partner on the basis that the Council did not have capacity or relevant expertise to transition to the new system. The Crown Commercial Services framework was used to identify suitable implementation providers and it was determined that only Inoapps could meet all requirements for implementation partner services. The Council contracted with Inoapps for this role for £1.2m. Inoapps had provided managed services to the Council since July 2016 and were a platinum Oracle partner. The appointments of Oracle and Inoapps were approved by Cabinet on 9 October 2019.

The contract with Oracle was for five years, with an option to extend to seven years at £700k per annum. The overall cost of the project, for the duration of the five-year contract with Oracle, including implementation partner costs, was estimated to be £5.64m.

There have been repeated delays to the implementation with changes to the go live date for the new system, which will not now go live before EBS becomes unsupported at the end of 2021.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

#### **Business case for change**

An options appraisal and financial appraisal were used to make the decision on the future of the Council's ERP system. Whilst these would form part of a business case, no outline or full business case for change was developed and approved. We would have expected a business case to have been developed for a project of such strategic importance and cost. Failure to do so has impacted on the implementation stage of the project.

#### **Transformation potential**

The introduction of a new ERP system is typically used to support wider organisational transformation, improvement, efficiencies and savings. Indeed, one of the reasons for replacing EBS was long-term user dissatisfaction with reference to inefficiencies, inadequate reporting functionality and prolonged processes to access necessary data, with inefficient "work around" solutions being applied.

The lack of a formal business case has meant that benefits relating to the transformation potential of the new system have not been clear and have not been at the forefront of the implementation. This has been compounded by a lack of corporate ownership of the project and engagement by services, with the project seen as Finance or HR related, and not an enabler for organisational transformation and improvement.

Instead a "lift and shift" approach has been adopted minimising the opportunities for change and improvement and the use of the functionality of the new system. Once the new system has gone live there is an intention to undertake "development sprints" to identify transformation opportunities. However, the system will have already been implemented by this time, limiting the potential for such improvements without incurring additional costs in enhancements to the system. The Council has also used funding set aside for these sprints to fund cost overruns during the implementation stage.

## KLOE A10: Introduction of new ERP System (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's management of the introduction of Oracle Fusion and understanding implementation delays and their impact.

#### **Project finances**

The options appraisal set out the total costs as follows.

Description	Costs 2019/20 to 2023/24 £000
EXPENDITURE	
Implementaiton Costs	
Implementaton Suppprt	1,206
Development sprints	600
Internal project team	386
Ongoing Costs	
SaaS subsriptions	3,240
Managed service support partner	70
Archiving system	140
Total costs	5,642
FUNDING	
Earmarked reserve	2,625
Redirection of budgets for current system costs	2,458
Resources revenue budget	682
Total funding	5,765
Contingency	123

The earmarked reserve of  $\pounds 2.625$ m was to be used to cover implementation costs and included  $\pounds 600$ k for post go live activity (development sprints) and  $\pounds 363$ k as contingency, in addition to the  $\pounds 123$ k contingency identified via the original funding proposal.

An additional £605k was added to the reserve from COVID-19 emergency funding to fund additional costs incurred due to delays.

A breakdown of the planned allocation of the earmarked reserve is set out below.

Description	£
Oracle Subscriptions	438,000
Inoapps Implementation Contract	1,224,150
Development Sprints (4 x £150k)	600,000
Project Team/Contingency	362,850
Total funded by earmarked reserve	2,625,000
Covid Emergency Funding	605,000
Total Funding	3,230,000

The development sprint, project team / contingency and COVID-19 emergency funding are currently over committed by £7.8k. Additional costs have been incurred in relation to extension to EBS licences, use of additional support due to the delays to going live, and contract variations with Inoapps.

#### **Governance Arrangements**

There is a programme board which includes officers from the Council and representatives from Inoapps, and a programme team including representatives from both organisations. The Council has established a programme management office (PMO).

The Board reporting includes risk and issues logs and highlight reports. During the pandemic and when renegotiating the contract position with Inoapps and the subsequent focus securing clarity from Inoapps on their position, these have not always received appropriate focus.

Due to changes in the Council's senior officers there has not been stability with those attending he project board. This includes the chair of the Board, which was originally the then Executive Director of Resources, followed by the then Chief Executive, and is currently chaired by the Director for Strategy and Change.

The contract includes a statement of works which defines key project roles. Whilst the Council has a defined programme lead and programme manger for the project, the changes to senior officers involved in the project have created confusion over who is in the Senior Responsible Officer role, both within the Council and within Inoapps. It is a position which remains unclear.

### KLOE A10: Introduction of new ERP System (cont'd)

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's management of the introduction of Oracle Fusion and understanding implementation delays and their impact.

#### Governance arrangements (cont'd)

The Cabinet approved the decision to progress the new ERP system and appoint Oracle and Inoapps. There have been limited subsequent updates to Cabinet, with the portfolio holder receiving updates via director briefings.

#### **Contract management**

The programme manager and PMO, supported by the programme lead, are responsible for managing the contract with Inoapps. Where a contract variation is proposed by Inoapps the PMO discusses with relevant Council stakeholders and is then passed to the Programme Board for approval. The programme lead then completes the change request which becomes an addendum to the original contract.

The impact of COVID-19 led to a review of the implementation timetable during Summer 2020, given its impact on for example system testing and training activity. At the same time Inoapps identified the need for significant contract variations, believing they had under-scoped the resources requite to implement the project. The original contract was awarded on a time and materials basis. The Council, in negotiating revised contract terms with Inoapps moved to fixed price terms with payment based on Inoapps meeting specified milestones, which was agreed in November 2020.

#### The role of Oracle

Inoapps are a platinum implementation partner to Oracle, and Oracle are the provider of the new system being implemented. Having purchased Oracle Fusion the Council has not been able to effectively escalate the implementation issues with Oracle, in order for Oracle to support a resolution.

#### **Organisational involvement**

During the majority of the implementation stage of Oracle Fusion there has been ineffective engagement from across directorates and services. This has started to change, with greater Director ownership, but as already noted, there remains a need for greater senior leadership oversight.

#### The current position

Since the fixed price contract was agreed, with Inoapps taking a greater commercial risk on implementation, and having under-scoped their original bid, there has been increasing tensions between the Council and their implementation partner and frustrations from the Council at the level of support being provided by Inoapps.

This has lead to an "us and them" culture rather than a joint implementation focus. At the time of this review relationships between the Council and Inoapps had broken down, further impacting on the progress of the implementation stage.

The go live date for the new system was deferred from October 2019 to April 2019, and subsequently deferred to October 2020. There is currently no go live date pending the Council agreeing a way forward with Inoapps.

Because the go live date will not take place prior to 31 December 2021 when EBS, the current system, becomes unsupported, the Council has approached Oracle, who also provide the EBS, to negotiate temporary support from January 2022. Oracle are seeking a 12-month extension to EBS which the Council would like to reduce due to the impact on unplanned costs, but the lack of a firm go live date is not helpful to these negotiations.

We understand that a report is being prepared for Cabinet on 24 November which will set out the Council's options and include a cost benefit analysis of these options.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The risk to the Council of having no ERP system available from the 1 January 2022 is significant.

The Council must prioritise corporate effort to:

- ensure that temporary support is agreed with Oracle for EBS continuity.
- have an honest and frank discussion with Inoapps and urgently agree a clear resolution on the way forward.
- review governance arrangements so that good practice (such as Managing Successful Programmes) is in place and embedded, including clarity on the SRO role and approach to risk management.
- review the resourcing and scope of the implementation to ensure that it is realistic, given current circumstances, focuses on outcomes as well as costs, and there is organisation wide engagement and ownership of the programme.
- confirm a realistic and achievable go live date.
- ensure for future major projects a full business case is developed and approved.

### **KLOE B1: Chief Officers**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's compliance with JNC guidance in relation to the recent departure of certain chief officers.

#### Background

The Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) for Chief Executives of Local Authorities is the national negotiating body for the pay and conditions of service of chief executives in England and Wales.

The JNC sets out the national conditions of service for chief officers of local authorities, which include model procedures in relation to performance management, capability, disciplinary and redundancy.

There is a different negating body for pay and conditions for other local government workers, the National Joint Council (NJC) for Local Government Services.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

The Council's former Executive Director of Resources received a complaint in relation to certain actions that were believed to be outside Council policies and procedures. The actions related to matters over 5 years old and appear to have been precipitated by a change in control of the labour group. The then Chief Executive, after undertaking a fact-finding exercise and reviewing the position, invoked the model JNC disciplinary procedure. The Executive Director was suspended in March 2020 and the Council engaged the LGA to undertake an independent investigation. Prior to the conclusion of this investigation the Council finalised its senior management review which created a new structure for the Council's leadership team, resulting in the deletion of all Executive Director roles and the creation of new Director roles. The Executive Director chose not to apply for a new Director role, which led to the officer being made redundant by the Council before the investigation by the LGA was completed.

The Council's former Chief Executive departed the Council very quickly in July 2021 as a result of the breakdown in their working relationship with the new Leader of the Council. A decision was made by the two individuals concerned that the Chief Executive would leave the Council my mutual agreement, before the JNC model procedure could be invoked.

Following the decision being made the Council took external legal advice on employment law and sought advice from the LGA and various options were retrospectively considered, including the Chief Executive remaining in post, the Chief Executive claiming constructive dismissal, early retirement and mutual agreement, with the latter being considered the best value for money option.

The prior to previous Chief Executive also left before the JNC model procedure was invoked. The context was a Standards investigation, and the officer chose to resign rather than progressing to the formal procedure

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The Chief Executive and Leader are key roles in any Council, and their working relationship is critical to the effective running of the organisation. There are many examples in the local government sector where Chief Executives have left councils by mutual consent and not followed model procedures, for example, when there is a change in Leader.

However, given the context at the Council, the departure of the two previous Chief Executives in a similar manner will have contributed to the lack of trust and uncertainty in the organisation which is highlighted elsewhere in this report. This has been exacerbated by the departure of the Executive Director of Finance through a restructure

We also note that the speed of the decision for the former Chief Executive to leave, and the lack of other senior officer involvement (such as from the Monitoring Officer and Director of HR) and not taking legal advice prior to the decision being made created a risk that each party may have had a different interpretation of the outcome of the discussion and the decision being made.

The Council needs to consider how it can restore trust between officers and members. The Council should ensure that at the very least, appropriate internal and external advice is sought should the departure of a chief officer by mutual consent is agreed.

### **KLOE B2: Senior leadership**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the background to senior leadership changes and the impact of interim officers in place.

#### Background

The Council has been through a period of significant change to its leadership, both in terms of senior officers and senior members. Following the local elections in May 2021 a new Leader was elected, who appointed a new Cabinet with effect from June 2021. Many of these Cabinet members had not previously held a Cabinet role, and some were fairly new to the role of councillor.

An interim Chief Executive has been in role since August 2021 and there has been significant changes to chief officers over the past year, with vacancies being filled by either external interims, or Council officers in acting up roles. These changes were driven in large part by a senior management review which concluded in October 2020, although we note that some chief officer departures were caused by unrelated circumstances. The changes are summarised in the table below.

Posts Prior to Senior	Leaving	Posts following Senior	Interim Status	Interim	Permanent	Permanent
Management Review	Date	Management Review	interim status	Start Date	status	start date
Chief Executive	Jul-21	Chief Executive	Exernal interim	Aug-21	Vacant	n/a
Deputy Chief Executive	n/a	Deputy Chief Executive	Vacant	n/a	Vacant	n/a
Executive Director - Adult Social						
Care, Health & Wellbeing	Jul-19		e 1			1 1 2024
Director - Adult Social Care		Director - Adult Social Care	Exernal interim	Apr-21		July 2021
Director - Public Health	n/a	Director - Public Health	n/a	n/a	No change	n/a
Director - Prevention &						
Protection	n/a					
Executive Director - Resources	Sep-20					
Director - Law & Governance /		Director - Law & Governance				
Monitoring Officer	n/a	/ Monitoring Officer	n/a	n/a	No change	n/a
Director - Finance	n/a	Director - Finance	Acting up	Mar-20	In role	Aug 2021
Director - Business Strategy and		Director - Business Strategy			Internal	
Change	n/a	& Change	n/a	n/a	appointment	Dec 2020
Executive Director -						
Neighbourhoods	Dec-20					
Director - Homes &	Mar-21					
Director - Housing	n/a	Director - Housing	Exernal interim	Apr-21	In role	July 2021
Director - Borough Economy	n/a	Director - Borough Economy	Exernal interim	Apr-21	Appointed	Nov 2021
Director - Regeneration &		Director - Regeneration &				
Growth	Mar-20	Growth	Acting up	Mar-20	In role	Sept 2021
Executive Director - Children's						
Services	Aug-21					
Director - Education & Skills	Apr-21					
			Acting up,			
			supported by			
Director - Children's Services	n/a	Director - Children's Services	external interim	Aug-21	Appointed	Nov 2021

#### Post created Post deleted

#### Key findings

Other than the Chief Executive there are currently ten chief officer roles, of these four are recent external appointments, and two other external appointments have been made with these officers starting in November 2021. Three officers remain from the previous leadership team, two in the same role and one appointed to one of the new roles created by the review.

Two roles remain vacant: the Chief Executive and the Deputy Chief Executive, with the recruitment of the former recently initiated. The Council has decided to not recruit the Deputy Chief Executive and to review the need for this role.

In addition there is a Director of HR, which is not a permanent role and is being held by an external interim.

The impact of this recent period of change has been instability and uncertainty for the organisation. Whilst external interims are recognised positively for the experience they bring from working with other councils and having a "fresh pair of eyes" on some of the service challenges being faced, the wider organisation considers the use of interims as maintaining a holding pattern before permanent chief officers join. The Council will reach the position of having all roles filled by a permanent officers during November 2021, other than the two vacancies noted above.

The leadership of senior members and senior officers is critical to good governance and decision making, and more generally for the ability for the Council to deliver its services effectively and to progress its medium-to-long-term priorities.

All key stakeholders met during the course of this review recognised that the changes to senior officer and members has led to some immediate and positive changes. However, it was further recognised that the Council is at the start of a necessary improvement journey, and for these "green shoots" to deliver the widespread changes required, the Council's leadership needs be relentless in its focus in delivering and embedding sustainable change. We note that these 'green shoots' only occurred on appointment of the current interim chief executive and we do not consider that they are embedded in the Council.

Critical to this sustainable change will be the appointment of the right permanent Chief Executive, and the Council must ensure an effective recruitment process, including maximising the chances of attracting a pool of appropriate candidates. Should the appointment of a permanent Chief Executive not be successful the Council should seek to retain the current interim Chief Executive and move this to a full time contract.

### **KLOE B3: Complaints**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the appropriateness of complaints made against senior officers and the responses to these complaints.

#### Background

The Council has arrangements in place setting out how to make a complaint that an elected member has failed to comply with the Council's Code of Conduct. This is in line with the Localism Act 2011 (the Act). The Council's Monitoring Officer, or in their absence or where there is a conflict of interest, the Deputy Monitoring Officer, administers the system for dealing with complaints. The arrangements set out the stages of a complaint should be dealt with: no further action, local resolution or requires investigation.

The Act requires the Council to appoint at least one Independent Person whose views must be sought before it takes a decision on whether an investigation should proceed. The Council has agreed to there being three Independent Persons, who attend the Standards Committee as observers.

There are separate arrangements in place for complaints against senior officers which follow national JNC model procedures, with the Council's Chief Executive (unless conflicted) deciding if the thresholds are met to instigate an investigation.

There are separate procedures for whistleblowing complaints, which do not form part of the scope of this review.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

The Council has had a history of complaints against members, many of which were not found to be circumstances that were in breach of the Code of Conduct. These complaints have been from other members, officers and members of the public.

We note that the Monitoring Officer has been subject to a number of complaints from members which have not met the threshold for investigation, and there is a perception that at least some of these complaints have been spurious and reflect a blame culture. We note that no complaint has been upheld against the monitoring officer. Similarly, in the case of other complaints against officers, rather than complaints relating to breaches of Council policies and procedures, they are based on the dislike of an individual or of an individual's response or actions during meetings.

This forms part of a wider culture and a deterioration in trust and respect between members, and between members and officers. This is arguably also reflected in a culture of written communications in relation to member enquiries. For example, in many instances officers want to have a written record of their response due to the culture of the organisation.

Again, due to the organisational culture, there is a perception that historically for some officer complaints, investigations have been undertaken due to concern of the consequences of deciding no further action was required.

The level complaints at the Council has been described as a "mini industry" which takes up valuable time and resource, should the complaints be spurious.

At its most recent meeting of the Standards Committee on 11 June 2021 an update was provided on live member complaints. There were twelve complaints, which had been received between July 2019 and May 2021, all alleging breaches of the Member Code of Conduct. Investigations had been invoked for all 12 and of these 7 had concluded there had been no breach, 2 had recommended local resolution, 2 could not be progressed (the member was no longer a councillor or the complainant did not engage in the process) with the outcome of one complaint outstanding.

There are signs that the new political administration has moved away from this culture, but this is not yet evident across the wider councillor group.

The Council's senior leadership – both officer and member – must act to change the culture and organisational ethos in relation to complaints, and to restore balance and proportionality.

### **KLOE B5: Standards Committee**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the appropriateness of the work undertaken by the Standards Committee.

#### Background

In 2018, the Committee on Standards in Public Life conducted a review of local government ethical standards and invited the submission of comments and recommendations from local authorities and representative bodies. The Committee published its final report in January 2019, which included a recommendation that the Local Government Association (LGA) should draft a Model Code of Conduct.

The LGA Model Code of Conduct was drafted in consultation with representative bodies of councillors and officers of the local government. The final Code was published in December 2020. The LGA published a supplementary guidance document to support the Code in April 2021.

During the 2020-21 municipal year, the Council's Ethical Standards and Member Development Committee (the Standards Committee) undertook a wide-ranging review of the Members Code of Conduct and associated arrangements. This included the creation of an Ethical Standards Working Group which was established to guide improvement in the Council's Ethical Framework. Engagement with members included five engagement sessions in December 2020. These sessions covered:

- A review of the Member Code of Conduct, and members were supportive of the adoption of the LGA Code of Conduct, subject to an amendment to the interests of family members and close associates.
- The Council's revised social media policy which included ensuring that issues with social media were addressed and appropriate support provided to members.
- ٠ Members Interests to ensure that members were confident and clear in understanding disclosure of interests, their obligations, and how to deal with issues if they emerge. Members suggested that greater clarity around the issue of lobbying should be provided. Separately and in line with the recommendations within the LGA Model Code of Conduct, the Council's Gift and Hospitality arrangements were revised, and the limit was lowered from £100 to £50.
- Review of the arrangements for dealing with complaints under the Code of Conduct -٠ these were amended to include an assessment criteria and indicative timescales for monitoring and clarity purposes, including reporting on the progress of the complaint in the case of delays.
- Duty to promote and maintain high standards of conduct, which focused on raising awareness of the role and work of the councillor and promoting high standards, particularly on the specifics relevant to individuals in their respective wards, towns and across the borough

For those members unable to attend these sessions a questionnaire was sent to ensure that all members could contribute. The feedback from the sessions was collated and presented to members at three further sessions held in February 2021.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

#### March 2021 Standards Committee

At its meeting on 12 March 2021 the Standards Committee recommended the approval of :

- The revised Member Code of Conduct, and that these would be reviewed on an annual basis, alternating between a desk top review and a more detailed review.
- The revised arrangements for dealing with complaints under the Code
- The revised social media policy and that the Monitoring Officer be authorised to make any revisions/updates to the guidance which accompanies the social media policy, in consultation with the Chair of Standards Committee,
- The revised gifts and hospitality guidance
- The protocol for meetings to take place on a regular basis between senior officers, political group leaders and chief whips to talk about standards issues.
- The retention policy for Members' Register of Interests be set for as long as a person remains a Councillor, plus three months which represents the relevant limitation period for disclosure of information.
- A review of the recruitment process for Independent Persons be undertaken, in consultation with the Standards Working Group, and a further report submitted to a future meeting of the Standards Committee.
- a further report be submitted to the Ethical Standards and Member Development Committee/Standards Working Group in respect of DBS Basic Checks for elected Members.
- · That a review of the composition of the Ethical Standards and Member Development Committee and operation be undertaken in the new municipal year

These were subsequently approved by full Council with effect from the 2021/22 municipal year

### **KLOE B5: Standards Committee**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the appropriateness of actions taken by the Standards Committee.

#### KEY FINDINGS (Cont'd)

The Standards Committee also agreed that the member development programme be updated to include training on:

- the Code of Conduct;
- members' interests;
- gifts and hospitality;
- lobbying;
- · arrangements for dealing with complaints;
- use of social media;
- · promoting high standards, and
- that the induction programme for new members to be updated to include the same training, and to incorporate in member Personal Development Plans (PDPs) for any issues on an individual basis.

#### **Progress on actions**

The new Code and associated guidance and arrangements have been in place since the start of the 2021/22 municipal year. The Monitoring Officer has not yet needed to update the social media policy.

The training on the Code of Conduct, lobbying, and gifts and hospitality has been completed. A working group of the Standards Committee is updating the member development programme and engaging members on their development needs, including those members who chair committees and are hold appointments to outside bodies.

The Standards Committee working group has completed its review of the recruitment of Independent Persons who attend the Standards Committee as observers. There are currently three Independent Person roles, with one currently vacant.

Changes to how complaints were reported were introduced at the 11 June 2021 meeting of the Standards Committee, to provide assurance that complaints are being dealt with in a timely way and to provide the Committee with updates on progress. Importantly, these updates are reported on the basis of anonymity, and allows the Committee to identify trends and issues based on the nature of complaints raised

A Standards Committee working group has been established to consider the need for DBS checks for members, which has not yet reported to its parent committee

#### **Reopening of old complaints**

At its meeting on 11 June 2021 a member of the Standards Committee put forward a resolution to review all previous cases of complaints, to ensure appropriate processes had been followed and to identify any lessons learned. This was not approved due to there being unclear reasons on justifiable cause, and no advice having been sought on the implications of reopening cases which had concluded in line with the Council's policies and procedures.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The unsuccessful resolution to reopen closed complaints is an example of the challenge the Council has in moving on from the past, and as highlighted in relation to KLOE B4, in changing the culture and organisational ethos in relation to complaints, to restore balance and proportionality.

More generally, the recent actions being led by the Standards Committee are good practice and are important given the recent history of the Council. More critical than approving the updated Code and related arrangements will be member compliance, and the **member training and development programme must play a key role in ensuring members fully understand the expectations and standards relating to their role.** It will take time for the wider organisation to believe that change is happening and embedded, from observing consistency in member behaviour in line with the Code, and that are all respectful of those they work with and of the Council as a civic institution.

No meetings have yet taken place between senior officers, political group leaders and chief whips. These meetings should take place to ensure that these stakeholders are able to discuss emerging issues and trends, recognise good behaviours and discuss how to manage behaviours not in line with the Code.

### **KLOE B6: Audit Committee**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the actions undertaken by the Audit Committee during 2021 in relation to the review into the Wragge report.

#### Background

In Autumn 2014 allegations about the then Deputy Leader were made on social media, which lead to police involvement, a standards complaint being made against the Deputy Leader, which in turn led to an internal audit investigation and senior officers commissioning an independent investigation by Wragge and Co Solicitors. During the course of this investigation a complaint was made in relation to the solicitor conducting the review, which led to the Council engaging a QC to review the investigation.

The report from Wragge and Co (the Wragge report) was eventually finalised in April 2016. Following publication further standards complaints, investigation and legal action took place, including a judicial review on behalf of the (by then) former Deputy Leader. A further internal review was undertaken at the request of the then Leader into the circumstances surrounding the Wragge report and issues which subsequently emerged, which reported in June 2020 (the Cox report).

On the 18 March 2021 the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee (the Audit Committee) met to discuss the Cox report, based on a report from Audit and Governance Panel, which had been established by the Audit Committee Chair with the objective to provide a safe space to consider this long-standing governance matter and to make recommendations to the Audit Committee with a view to determine if the matter had been addressed sufficiently to enable closure, or whether there were further steps or actions necessary to enable the matter to be concluded.

The Audit and Governance Panel report recognised:

- that over recent years the Council has dealt with and continues to deal with a number of governance concerns and issues. Whilst some are historic in nature, a number have had a tendency to resurface periodically sometimes due to concerns over how they may have been addressed previously.
- in order to address these issues effectively and enable the council to move on and focus on its ambitious objectives as detailed within its corporate plan, considerable time and resources have been expended to examine the identified governance issues and related concerns.
- a number of matters have reached a point whereby the Council has to either been able to identify and address shortcomings, or despite its endeavours, it is unlikely that the council will be able to fully understand the history, chronology or be able to restore the council to its previous position. This can be for various reasons, such as key individuals no longer employed by the council.

 the Council needs to ensure that its conducts itself legally and consistently with recognised good governance principles and practices. The Council is required to consider serious allegations in respect of its conduct or behaviours which could give rise to action against it, reputational harm, or lost confidence. The Council is obliged to consider relevant arrangements in relation to which their legality or whether their ongoing continuance could expose the Council to harm or claims. However, the consideration of such allegations needs to be proportionate and in the public interest.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

The meeting of the Audit Committee on 18 March 2021 lasted almost six hours and adjourned before considering the matter in its entirety. The meeting was contentious with members being concerned about the late provision of papers and a lack of consensus on decisions (with the Audit Committee Chair taking the casting vote on a number of decisions). Due to the length of the meeting a decision on the final matter under discussion about the Wragge report was deferred. Following the committee meeting a complaint was raised against the monitoring officer. This has not yet been resolved.

Due to the pre-election period relating to the May local elections, the Audit Committee did not reconvene until 24 May 2021, where discussions were able to conclude.

The Chair and a number of other members of the Audit Committee changed in June 2021 for the new municipal year. The Audit Committee met on 24 June of 2021 and the minutes of the March and May meetings were presented for approval. However, members of the Committee did not approve the minutes as a correct record and requested that they be submitted to a future meeting for further consideration, with a potential for a further review to be undertaken.

At the next meeting of the Audit Committee on 16 September 2021 the minutes of the March and May meetings were approved with the central action to arrange for appropriate apologies to be made where this had been agreed as appropriate to individuals involved in the original Wragge review, and that the Monitoring Officer update the Committee when these apologies have been made.

### **KLOE B6: Audit Committee**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the actions undertaken by the Audit Committee during 2021 in relation to the review into the Wragge report.

#### **Conclusions and recommendations**

The Wragge and Cox reports concerned significant governance related issues and, as the Audit and Governance Panel stated, the Council needs to ensure that it conducts itself legally and consistently with recognised good governance principles and practices. However, we note that:

- The matters relate to events in 2014.
- The matters have been subject to significant scrutiny since 2014 including a judicial review.
- The review in 2020 and the Audit Panel and Committee in 2021 took place when there were significant service issues within the Council and used a significant amount of member and officer capacity.
- The matters continue to divide opinions and have resulted in a further lengthy process to agree a resolution.

Now that the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee has agreed the actions to bring this long-standing matter to resolution, it will be important that – as the Audit and Governance Panel recognised - the Council manages its position so that the matter does not resurface, so that it can move on and focus on its corporate objectives.



### **KLOE B7: Financial reporting**

The purpose of this KLOE was to consider the Council's response to recommendations raised in our 2019/20 audit findings report.

#### Background

Our 2019/20 Audit Findings Report (AFR) highlighted a number of concerns about the Council's financial reporting in relation to the 2019/20 financial statements, including late submission of the draft accounts, incorrect working papers, the basis for provisions, a material error between cash and creditors, a material error on the cashflow forecast, and the basis for some asset valuations in particular in relation to leisure centres and the Public sixth form centre, and the impact of this on the Council's group accounts.

Our 2019/20 AFR noted that at that time we did not consider that these were sufficient to warrant a qualification of the VfM conclusion. However, should these matters reoccur in relation to the 2020/21 financial statements audit, we will issue a qualified VfM conclusion on-financial reporting and consider the use of our wider reporting powers.

#### **KEY FINDINGS**

Management created an AFR action plan in response to the recommendations made as part of our 2019/20 audit and an associated project team to take forward these actions. As some of the key recommendation related to asset valuations, interim resource has been allocated to the asset management and valuations teams to progress associated actions.

We have reviewed this action plan which includes an owner and finance lead relating to each recommendation. The plan also sets out the actions required, delivery timescale and updates on progress.

In total there were 22 recommendations of which 13 were high priority and 9 medium priority. The latest version of the action plan reviewed confirms that ten associated actions had been completed (five each for high and medium priority) with the remainder in progress, with some of these having an inter dependency with the introduction of the new Oracle Fusion ERP system. As such, the delays in implementing the Council's new ERP system have an impact on successfully completing some actions

Four of the recommendations did not include required actions in the action plan, and 5 had no target date for completion

The Council does not currently have a corporate asset management database, instead relying on spreadsheets. The Council is taking steps to procure an asset management system, with a report planned to the December Cabinet. This system will take 12 to 18 months to procure and implement.

Acting up arrangements due to the vacant Director of Finance role until August 2021 has contributed to capacity constraints in delivering financial reporting responsibilities.

#### **RELATED FINDINGS**

Whilst the focus of this KLOE concerned the Council's annual financial statements, we identified the following in relation to other aspects of financial planning and reporting in the Council:

- There is not a comprehensive understanding across services of the make up and profile of individual budgets.
- There has not been a culture of undertaking financial benchmarking to help an understanding of unit costs.
- Budget management has been based on service bottom line rather than individual budgets.
- The Leadership Team has not received regular budget monitoring reports.
- Director and service engagement in the annual budget setting process has been limited

The above has been recognised and changes introduced by the new Director of Finance and interim Chief Executive, such as the introduction of financial benchmarking, "star chambers" for budget setting, and more regular budget monitoring by the Leadership Team.

#### Recommendations

Management should ensure that the AFR action plan sets out actions and completion dates in relation to all recommendations. It should also identify where the new ERP system implementation and the planned asset management system could cause delays or impacts on planned actions.

Management should ensure that the changes in relation to budget setting and budget management recently introduced are sustained, and take steps to manage any weaknesses not yet addressed.

Management should ensure the Finance team has appropriate skills and capacity to manage the Council's financial reporting responsibilities.



### Appendix A: Improvement recommendations

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships	
1.	Embedding the changes that have been made by the Leadership Team and those that are planned will be critical if the Council is to realise its strategic ambition and provide effective governance.	15
2.	Enhancement of the induction programme to new members of Cabinet, including on local government finance and their governance roles is recommended.	15
3.	The Council should ensure that corporate KPIs are agreed so that the implementation of the Corporate Plan can be effectively monitored.	16
4.	The forward plan of the Cabinet should be shared with the Audit Committee and Scrutiny Board to help structure their agenda planning.	16
5.	The Leadership Team should agree key medium-term financial objectives and principles. There should be effective ownership of the principles that underpin the budget setting process, for example the Council's approach to reserves, contingency and Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).	16
6.	Senior officers and senior members must lead by example to ensure that the "tone from the top" consistently reflects these values and behaviours. This is critical in ensuring that the wider organisation recognises that changes have been made and that all people are confident in adopting these values and behaviours. This should build on recently introduced staff briefings to include a programme of staff engagement including "pulse" checks to benchmark and monitor progress on the organisation's wellbeing.	17
7.	The Council should ensure that the review of the member development programme is appropriate. In particular, thought should be given to how members with special responsibility roles are developed and supported. This should include succession planning for these roles.	17
8.	Further work is required to establish a formal performance management framework and agree a set of key corporate indicators for the Leadership Team to collectively manage, receive appropriate management information to monitor progress, and set out clear lines of accountability, responsibility, and delegated authority.	17
9.	The recent introduction of financial benchmarking will need to be sustained to create a culture of curiosity in services in how nearest statistical neighbours are performing, to support savings identification and to drive improvements	17

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE B4: Officer and member relationships (cont'd)	
10.	The Council should continue its more outward looking approach is sustained and develop key local and sub-regional relationships.	18
11.	When investing in the communications team, the Council should also use this as an opportunity to ensure more effective internal communications, including with back-bench members.	18
12.	There is a need to ensure that members of scrutiny and audit committees are aware of their governance roles including how to interrogate reports and ask the right questions.	18
	KLOE A1: Sandwell Children's Trust	
13.	<ul> <li>The Council's senior leadership – both officer and member – should prioritise corporate effort and develop a clear strategy for working with SCT to ensure it remains on its improvement trajectory. This should include:</li> <li>working with SCT to progress a multi-agency early intervention and prevention strategy.</li> <li>ensuring SCT has an appropriately resourced and skilled placements team in place to effectively manage the care market.</li> <li>conducting a review of KPIs to ensure they are effective for current circumstances.</li> <li>undertaking financial benchmarking in relation to children's social care, and take a realistic and pragmatic view on the level of funding required.</li> <li>reviewing the governance roles of officers and members in relation to SCT so that they are clear on their responsibilities, avoid duplication, ensure effective communication and that there is a collective understanding of the performance of SCT and how risks and issues are being managed.</li> </ul>	22
	KLOE A2: Sandwell Leisure Trust	
14.	The Senior Leadership - both officer and member - must take ownership of this issue, prioritise corporate effort and take urgent steps to either resolve the current position with SLT or consider the options for alternative provision should either party decide to terminate the current contract, to ensure the continuity of future leisure service provision and associated reputational impacts.	24
	KLOE A3: Providence Place	
15.	Where the Council considers similar transactions in future, those charged with making decisions must satisfy themselves that they fully understand the detail of the options being proposed. Council officers and their advisors have a responsibility to ensure that members making decisions do so having fully understood these complexities and risks.	26
16.	The Council should ensure that all future property or land acquisitions and disposals are clearly aligned with relevant Council property related strategies.	26

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE A4: SEND Transport	
17.	The Council's senior leadership – both officers and members – must place priority on agreeing the outcome of the SEND Transport procurement exercise to ensure a further contract extension is not required. This should include:	29
	Not losing the significant progress made on the contract specification's focus on service quality.	
	Greater support, involvement, dialogue and oversight with the officer teams with responsibility for progressing the procurement.	
	Ensuring the contract provides the Council with effective management and oversight of the personal transport market.	
18.	<ul> <li>For the conclusion of the SEND Transport procurement and for all future major procurements, the Council should ensure that:</li> <li>Record keeping and declarations of interest are undertaken in line with Council policies and procedures.</li> <li>Decision making does not create real or perceived risks in relation to inappropriate procurement decisions.</li> </ul>	30
	<ul> <li>Procurement timescales provide adequate time for both suppliers to submit high quality bids, and the Council to undertake appropriate evaluation, scrutiny and decision making. This timescale should include appropriate time in advance of the procurement for the council to undertake the necessary strategic thinking and planning required, and mitigate the risk of not making an award in the planned timescale</li> </ul>	
	KLOE A5: Sandwell Land and Property	
19.	The Council should ensure that when considering establishing an arm's length company in the future there is a clear purpose for doing so and that those officers / members of the Council in company director roles are clear of their role and responsibilities in relation to that company.	32
20.	Where arms length companies already exist the Council should gain assurances that company directors fully understand their company roles and responsibilities, that the company administration is properly resourced and appropriate training is provided to company directors. The purpose of the company should be revisited on a regular basis to determine whether the company continues to be of benefit to the Council.	32
	KLOE A6: MADE Festival	
21.	As part of the planned review of the scheme of delegation the Council should ensure that there is clarity of decision making on hosting events, and that the governance arrangements relating to such decisions are effective and clearly communicated.	33

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE A7: Waste Service	
22.	The Council should prioritise corporate effort to ensure that the recovery plans are approved and appropriate senior management oversight is given to monitoring their effective delivery.	36
23.	The Council should ensure robust contract management arrangements are in place, and review the Key Output Targets (KOTs) and work with Serco to ensure they are line with Council expectations and the data is available to allow effective monitoring of contract outcomes.	36
24.	The Council should ensure that the investments specified in the contract with Serco are made, such as a new vehicle fleet.	36
	KLOE A9: Lion Farm	
25.	The Council must ensure that the recent re-engagement with the developer results in agreeing a clear way forward, including an action plan and timescale so there is clarity on the responsibilities for the Council and developer in order to progress the finalisation of the secondary option agreement, or to be clear on the legal process for both parties extricating themselves from the agreement and the associated terms.	39
26.	The Council must ensure that it has taken all necessary steps to ensure that arrangements are in place so that all the issues identified in the external review are appropriately mitigated and managed.	39
27.	The Council should review its procurement regulations and consider updating them to include land sales, including options agreements, to ensure that best value can be achieved.	39
	KLOE A10: Introduction of new ERP System	
28.	The Council must prioritise corporate effort to:	42
	ensure that temporary support is agreed with Oracle for EBS continuity.	
	have an honest and frank discussion with Inoapps and urgently agree a clear resolution on the way forward.	
	<ul> <li>review governance arrangements so that good practice (such as Managing Successful Programmes) is in place and embedded, including clarity on the SRO role and approach to risk management.</li> </ul>	
	• review the resourcing and scope of the implementation to ensure that it is realistic, given current circumstances, focuses on outcomes as well as costs, and there is organisation wide engagement and ownership of the programme.	
	confirm a realistic and achievable go live date.	
	ensure for future major projects a full business case is developed and approved.	

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE B1: Chief Officers	
29.	The Council should ensure that at the very least, appropriate internal and external advice is sought should the departure of a chief officer by mutual consent is agreed	43
	KLOE B2: Senior Leadership	
30.	Critical to this sustainable change will be the appointment of the right permanent Chief Executive, and the Council must ensure an effective recruitment process, including maximising the chances of attracting a pool of appropriate candidates. Should the appointment of a permanent Chief Executive not be successful the Council should seek to retain the current interim Chief Executive and move this to a full time contract.	44
	KLOE B3: Complaints	
31.	The Council's senior leadership – both officer and member – must act to change the culture and organisational ethos in relation to complaints, and to restore balance and proportionality.	45
	KLOE B5: Standards Committee	
32.	Member training and development programme must play a key role in ensuring members fully understand the expectations and standards relating to their role	47
33.	Meetings between senior officers, political group leaders and chief whips should take place to ensure that these stakeholders are able to discuss emerging issues and trends, recognise good behaviours and discuss how to manage behaviours not in line with the Code	47

#	Improvement recommendations	Page #
	KLOE B6: Audit Committee	
34.	Now that the Audit and Risk Assurance Committee has agreed the actions to bring this long-standing matter to resolution, it will be important that – as the Audit and Governance Panel recognised - the Council manages its position so that the matter does not resurface, so that it can move on and focus on its corporate objectives.	49
	KLOE B7: Financial Reporting	
35.	Management should ensure that the AFR action plan sets out actions and completion dates in relation to all recommendations. It should also identify where the new ERP system implementation and the planned asset management system could cause delays or impacts on planned actions	50
36.	Management should ensure that the changes in relation to budget setting and budget management recently introduced are sustained, and take steps to manage any weaknesses not yet addressed.	50
37.	Management should ensure the Finance team has appropriate skills and capacity to manage the Council's financial reporting responsibilities.	50

# Appendix B: The scope of the auditor's work on value for money arrangements

### Revised approach to value for money work for 2020/21

- On 1 April 2020, the National Audit Office introduced a new Code of Audit Practice which comes into effect from audit year 2020/21. The Code introduced a revised approach to the audit of value for money.
- There are three main changes arising from the NAO's new approach:
  - A new set of key criteria, covering financial sustainability, governance and improvements in economy, efficiency and effectiveness
  - More extensive reporting, with a requirement on the auditor to produce a commentary on arrangements across all of the key criteria
  - Auditors undertaking sufficient analysis on the local authority's value for money arrangements to arrive at far more sophisticated judgements on performance, as well as key recommendations on any significant weaknesses in arrangements identified during the audit.
- The Code requires auditors to consider whether the body has put in place proper arrangements to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources. When reporting on these arrangements, the Code requires auditors to structure their commentary on arrangements under the three specified reporting criteria.



#### Improving economy, efficiency and effectiveness

Arrangements for improving the way the body delivers its services. This includes arrangements for understanding costs and delivering efficiencies and improving outcomes for service users.



#### **Financial Sustainability**

Arrangements for ensuring the body can continue to deliver services. This includes planning resources to ensure adequate finances and maintain sustainable levels of spending over the medium term (3-5 years)



#### Governance

Arrangements for ensuring that the body makes appropriate decisions in the right way. This includes arrangements for budget setting and management, risk management, and ensuring the body makes decisions based on appropriate information

### Potential types of recommendations

A range of different recommendations could be made following the completion of work on the body's arrangements to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources, which are as follows:



#### Statutory recommendation

Written recommendations to the body under Section 24 (Schedule 7) of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. A recommendation under schedule 7 requires the body to discuss and respond publicly to the report.

#### Key recommendation

The Code of Audit Practice requires that where auditors identify significant weaknesses in arrangements to secure value for money they should make recommendations setting out the actions that should be taken by the body. We have defined these recommendations as 'key recommendations'.

#### Improvement recommendation

These recommendations, if implemented should improve the arrangements in place at the body, but are not made as a result of identifying significant weaknesses in the body's arrangements



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